

# Aristotle on Recollection in *De Memoria et Reminiscentia*

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## Introduction

In *De Memoria et Reminiscentia*, Aristotle discusses memory (μνήμη and μνημονεύειν) in the first chapter and recollection (ἀνάμνησις and ἀναμμήσκειν) in the second.<sup>1</sup> However, Annas doubts whether the text really distinguishes between memory and recollection, advising, “it [...] seems preferable to say that in his treatise Aristotle is discussing two kinds of memory, not memory plus the ‘specialized’ subject of recollection.”<sup>2</sup> In contrast, Bloch argues that Aristotle does indeed separate memory from recollection.<sup>3</sup>

I agree that Aristotle developed a “theory of recollection”; thus, I support Bloch’s interpretation in this respect. However, I disagree with Bloch regarding the content of this theory and the relation between memory and recollection. Based on my view, this paper aims to explore Aristotle’s theory of recollection by analyzing how he defines it in Chapter Two of *De Memoria et Reminiscentia*. In doing so, I will reject previous interpretations, including those by Annas and Bloch.

The first part of this paper argues that Aristotle delineates recollection along two lines—namely, (α1) “recollection is the recovery of knowledge or sensation” and (α2) “recollection is the recovery of the previous experience” —but shows that both descriptions similarly conceptualize “recollection.” The second part of the paper discusses these ideas about recovery in detail. The third part shows the importance of cognizing time for recollection by using “the movement of the thing” and “the movement of the time.” The last part explores the relation between recollection and memory by closely interpreting 451b5–6 in Chapter Two of *De Memoria et Reminiscentia*, a notoriously difficult passage.

## 1. The definition of recollection and the recovery of the image

In Chapter Two of *De Memoria et Reminiscentia*, Aristotle notes that the recollection is neither the recovery nor the acquisition of memory (2. 451a18–31)

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<sup>1</sup> Ross (1908: 4), Bloch (2007: 77), King (2009: 92).

<sup>2</sup> Annas (1992: 298).

<sup>3</sup> Bloch (2007: 116–118). On the relation between memory and recollection, Lang (1980: 393) claims that “memory is sharply disrelated from recollection and abstract thinking is performed by recollection.” In contrast, I expect them to be interrelated in some ways.

before claiming that “it is clear that one can remember things, even though he has not just now recollected them, but has sensed or experienced them for the first time” (2. 451a31–b2).<sup>4</sup> Moreover, he presents the following definition of “recollection.”<sup>5</sup>

T1: But when he recovers the knowledge, sensation or some other previous experience, the having state of which we call memory (οὗ ποτὲ τὴν ἔξιν ἐλέγομεν μνήμην), then this is to recollect one of the named objects [...] (2. 451b2–5)

I explore this definition to achieve my purpose in this paper. In T1, Aristotle seems to distinguish between what I term ( $\alpha 1$ ) and ( $\alpha 2$ ) in the Introduction above,<sup>6</sup> to which the previous studies have paid little attention. Specifically, as noted in the Introduction, I delineate ( $\alpha 1$ ) and ( $\alpha 2$ ) as follows:

( $\alpha 1$ ) the recovery of the knowledge or sensation

( $\alpha 2$ ) the recovery of the previous experience, the having state of which we call memory

At first glance, ( $\alpha 1$ ) and ( $\alpha 2$ ) appear to be different concepts. Here, it is important to explore what Aristotle means by “the previous experience, the having state of which we call memory,” which I capture in ( $\alpha 2$ ). Notably, some researchers situate this expression as “the final definition”<sup>7</sup> of memory.<sup>8</sup>

T2: [...] it [what memory and remembering is] is the state of having (ἔξις) an image (φάντασμα), taken as a representation (εἰκόν) of that of which it is an image [...]

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<sup>4</sup> This and all subsequent passages from *De Memoria et Reminiscentia* are from Bloch (2007). However, I may change his translation without warning.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. King (2009: 93–94).

<sup>6</sup> One of the anonymous reviewers suggested that “which” in “the having state of which we call memory” could be “the knowledge, sensation or some other previous experience.” Indeed, since Bloch himself translates 449b24–25 into “memory, then, is neither sensation nor conception, but a state of having one of these or an affection resulting from one of these, when some time elapses,” he does not distinguish between ( $\alpha 1$ ) and ( $\alpha 2$ ), and might consider the having state of sensation to be memory. However, as T3 and the discussion of it referenced below make clear, Aristotle believes that memory is the having state not of the perception itself but of something derived from the perception. Hence, I argue that “which” in “the having state of which we call memory” refers to only “the previous experience,” and thus that Aristotle distinguishes between ( $\alpha 1$ ) and ( $\alpha 2$ ).

<sup>7</sup> Bloch (2007: 35, n. 20), King (2009: 81–82).

<sup>8</sup> Wiesner (1998: 127, n. 15), Sakashita (2014: 273, n. 4).

(1. 451a15–16)

In T2, Aristotle establishes that a memory of X emerges with the following two conditions:

(μ1) the state of having an image x (of X)

(μ2) taking x as representation of X

(μ1) clearly suggests that “the previous experience, the having state of which we call memory” is an “image.”<sup>9</sup> Thus, keeping the final definition of memory in mind, (α2) in T1 speaks to “the recovery of an image.”

However, as King points out, T1 does not reference (μ2), which is included in the final definition of memory.<sup>10</sup> Therefore, this interpretation may be invalid. Rather, I think that T1 relates to the following passage in which Aristotle explains the acquisition of an image.<sup>11</sup>

T3: For clearly one must think about that which is so generated through sensation in the soul, that is, in that part of the body which contains it, as a sort of picture (ζωγράφημα τι), and the state of having πάθος we call “memory” (τὸ πάθος οὗ φαιμέν τὴν ἔξιν μνήμην εἶναι); for the movement produced stamps almost a sort of impression of the sense-impression, similar to what is done by people using their seals.

(1. 450a27–32)

T3 situates memory as the state of having πάθος derived from the sensation.<sup>12</sup> Here, movement—namely the imagination<sup>13</sup> — “produced stamps almost a sort of impression of the sense-impression.” For, perceiving X causes the imagination with an image of the perception, x, and the imagination produces the image “as a sort of picture” in the soul. Accordingly, T3 may suggest an “image (φάντασμα)” that is not present in this text. What Aristotle means by πάθος is the image. As Sakashita shows,

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<sup>9</sup> I think that the content of the image can be of a thing (X) or an event (S is P). For, as King (2009: 37) shows, since images can be derived from different kinds of sensations, it seems that different kinds of images can also exist. See also Sorabji (2004 :1).

<sup>10</sup> King (2004: 115).

<sup>11</sup> Sorabji (2004: 92) suggests that T1 may refer to T3.

<sup>12</sup> I do not follow Ross (1955: 238) and Bloch (2007: 231) who eliminate τὸ πάθος (450a30).

<sup>13</sup> It is said in *De Anima* that “imagination seems to be a sort of motion” (III 3. 428b11). Cf. Hicks (1907: 275–276). This passage from *De Anima* is from Shields (2016).

this πάθος signifies an “affected result (πάθημα)” and differs from πάθος (which is used here to in a way similar to ἔξις) in 449b24–25<sup>14</sup>. Indeed, there is a case where Aristotle uses πάθος to signify an image (φάντασμα) in *De Memoria et Reminiscentia* (1. 450a10–11).<sup>15</sup> Therefore, in T3, πάθος is an image and the state of having πάθος (the image) is memory.

If T1 refers to T3, then Aristotle figures memory as the state of having πάθος in mind. Hence, it seems that (α2) describes the recovery of πάθος. With this in hand, we may ask: is (α2) different from (α1)? Answering this question requires a consideration of (α1). To do so, it is helpful to turn to the following statement in *De Memoria et Reminiscentia*, which Aristotle makes before presenting his “provisional definition” of memory.

T4: However, when one has knowledge and sensation without performing these actions, then he recalls (μémνηται), in the case of knowledge because he has learned it or contemplated it, in the case of sensation because he has heard or seen it or sensed it in some other way; for it is always the case that when a person actualises as regards his memory (ἐνεργῆ κατὰ τὸ μνημονεύειν), what he does is to say in his soul that he has previously heard, sensed or thought about this.

(1. 449b18–23)<sup>16</sup>

T4 similarly figures “recall” and “actualises as regards his memory.”<sup>17</sup> Notably I would also like to argue here that Aristotle similarly conceptualizes “recalling” and “recollection.”<sup>18</sup> If “recall” involves having a previous sensation or knowledge without perceiving or learning it, then “recall” is similar to the recovery of knowledge and sensation captured in (α1).

Accordingly, I would like to posit the following relation between (α1) and (α2). (α1) establishes that a previous sensation or piece of knowledge requires an image, which arises from a previous sensation.<sup>19</sup> Meanwhile, as T3 shows, (α2) also figures

<sup>14</sup> Sakashita (2014: 269, n. 22). Cf. Sakashita (2014: 263, n. 2).

<sup>15</sup> Cf. Beare (1908).

<sup>16</sup> King (2009: 32) calls 449b22–23 in T4 the “Canonical Formula” of memory.

<sup>17</sup> Bloch (2007: 98–99) takes the latter as a “clarification” of the former, which has many meanings.

<sup>18</sup> On the relation between recall and recollection, see Section 3 of this paper.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. Sorabji (2004: 92). When the reacquisition of the previous knowledge rather than the previous sensation is mentioned, the treatment of atemporal truths, such as “the sum of the interior angles of a triangle is two right angles” becomes problematic. In other words, if memory can only be established for past things, can we have memories of truths that are apart from the past due to the

the image ( $\pi\acute{\alpha}\theta\omicron\varsigma$ ) as arising from a previous sensation. Therefore, both ( $\alpha 1$ ) and ( $\alpha 2$ ) deal with an image obtained from a previous sensation.

Finally, it is clear that ( $\alpha 1$ ) and ( $\alpha 2$ ) state the same thing. However, once ( $\alpha 2$ ) is separated from ( $\alpha 1$ ), it is possible to read “some other previous experience, the having state of which we call memory” in T1 as an image by referring to T3, without using T2, whose relationship with T1 could be problematic. From this, I draw the following interpretation: not referring T2 suggests that the image in T1 may differ from the image in the definition of memory (whether the provisional or final definition). Indeed, the passage “[...] the man who is recollecting deduces that he has previously seen or heard or experienced ( $\epsilon\pi\alpha\theta\epsilon$ ) something of this sort [...]” (2. 453a10–11) may indicate that the object of recollection is *past*  $\pi\acute{\alpha}\theta\omicron\varsigma$  (i.e., the image). This may provide grounds for rejecting Annas’ interpretation, which is examined in Section 4 of this paper. In other words, unlike the assumption adopted by previous studies that ( $\alpha 2$ ) in T1 refers to T2, I suggest that an image in the definition of memory and an image as the object of recollection may be different.<sup>20</sup>

## 2. Recollection as recovery

In the previous section, I extracted ( $\alpha 1$ ) and ( $\alpha 2$ ) from Aristotle’s definition of recollection and then showed that they similarly establish “recollection” as answerable to a previous sensation. In this section, I consider the importance of the recovery of the previous sensation or  $\pi\acute{\alpha}\theta\omicron\varsigma$ .

However, it is important to first establish that *De Memoria et Reminiscentia* suggests that an image can be lost. This is evident in the following passage (following T3):

T5: This is also the reason why those who are in much movement because of an affection or because of age do not come to have memory, as though the movement produced by sensation and the seal were impinged on running water, while others do not receive the impression because of damage in that which is receiving the affection—similar to the damage of old walls in buildings—and because of the hardness in it. Therefore, both the very young and old people have weak memories: for the former are fluctuating because of growth, the latter because of decay. Similarly neither those people that are too quick-witted nor those that are too slow-witted seem to possess a good memory: the former are

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absence of time? I reason, as Annas (1992: 301) does, that it is possible to remember not a truth itself but one’s own experience of having learned such a truth in the past.

<sup>20</sup> On this topic, see the latter half of the next section.

moister than what is needed, the latter are harder; thus the image does not remain in the soul of the former, while it does not make real contact with the latter.

(1. 450a32–b11)

In T5, Aristotle reasons that memory is relatively weak in people who experience many movement—that is, people who have strong and busy imaginations (“those who are in much movement”)—and in people who are impaired (those who “do not receive the impression because of damage in that which is receiving the affection”). The former (which includes “the very young” and “people that are too quick-witted”) do not remember because their strong imaginations interrupt memory<sup>21</sup>—as Aristotle put it, “the image does not remain in the soul.” Notably, in such people with strong and busy imaginations, an image still arises from a sensation,<sup>22</sup> but cannot stick or stay in the soul because they move too fast to allow it to make a firm and lasting impression. Meanwhile, the latter (which includes “old people” and “those that are too slow-witted”) are not able to internalize the impression—they cannot come into “real contact” with the image. In brief, we may conceptualize Aristotle’s work here as distinguishing between people who are forgetful and people who have difficulty recognizing or remarking things. The deeper point for our purposes is that T5 suggests the possibility of the loss of the image<sup>23</sup> by conceptualizing two types of people who struggle with memory. In explaining the sources of poor memory in this passage, Aristotle suggests that recovering an image of a previous sensation requires one to recognize and internalize the image.

But how exactly does one “recover” an image? Aristotle responds to this question with the following case, which he presents right before articulating a final definition of memory in Chapter One of *De Memoria et Reminiscentia*.

T6: And because of this we sometimes do not know, when such movements occur in our soul from the fact that we were sensing earlier, whether it happens in accordance with something that we have sensed, and we are sometimes in doubt (διστάζομεν) whether it is memory or not; but occasionally it happens that we come to think and recollect that we have heard or seen something earlier;

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<sup>21</sup> Sakashita (2014: 269, n. 25).

<sup>22</sup> Cf. Ross (1908: 256–257).

<sup>23</sup> I follow Ross (1955: 244), and argue that one must forget the previous sensation or πάθος to recollect. As King (2004: 101) says, it is the case that “Das Phänomen des Vergessens wird nicht explizit in *De mem.*,” but I understand that one “forgets” an image by lacking it after acquiring it.

and this is what happens, when, contemplating something as something in itself, you make a switch and contemplate it as a representation of something else.

(1. 451a2–8)

Although an image, *x*, actually arises from the sensation of *X*, one cannot sometimes identify whether this is the case. When this situation occurs, one is “in doubt [...] whether it is memory or not”<sup>24</sup> because it cannot satisfy the following condition in the final definition of memory.<sup>25</sup>

( $\mu$ 2) taking *x* as representation of *X*

Moreover, in this case, one sometimes recollects by contemplating an image, *x*, not as such but “as a representation of something else”; namely, of *X*.<sup>26</sup>

I think that Aristotle’s discussion of recollection in 451a5–8 answers the problem raised in 451a2–5 in T6. However, Sorabji claims that the concepts in 451a2–5 and 451a5–8 are independent and thus that Aristotle was not trying to solve the uncertainty about the source of such movements in the soul with the concept of recollection<sup>27</sup>; specifically, Sorabji translates  $\acute{\omicron}\tau\grave{\epsilon}\ \delta\acute{\epsilon}$  (451a5) as “at other times,”<sup>28</sup> which suggests that 451a5–8 breaks from 451a2–5. Sorabji’s translation and interpretation may be based on his view that memory precedes recollection.<sup>29</sup> Alternatively, if Aristotle’s delineation of recollection in 451a5–8 responds to the uncertainty he articulates in 451a2–5, then it follows that memory arises from the recollection.

However, it is far from clear whether Sorabji’s translation of  $\acute{\omicron}\tau\grave{\epsilon}\ \delta\acute{\epsilon}$  is correct. Neither G. Ross nor Bloch offer this translation.<sup>30</sup> In Section 4 of this paper, I take up 451a12–14 in more detail to trouble Sorabji’s view (he ignores this passage). However, here, what I want to establish is that because Aristotle suggests that recollection involves the creation of a representation of a particular object, stimuli,

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<sup>24</sup> The passages mentioned by Bonitz (1870: 201b14–19) show that  $\delta\iota\sigma\tau\acute{\alpha}\zeta\epsilon\iota\nu$  is peculiar to human beings. It seems that Aristotle thinks that other animals cannot recall by doubting their own memories. On this, see the conclusion of this paper.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. Sorabji (2004: 85–86). Lang (1980: 392) compares Aristotle’s theory of memory with Plato’s, and points out that this problem is “critical” for the former.

<sup>26</sup> Since the discussion of memory and recollection in T6 is related, as I will discuss later, I argue on the basis of 1. 450b 20–451a2 that “something else” is the *X* from which the image, *x*, is derived.

<sup>27</sup> Sorabji (2004: 87).

<sup>28</sup> Sorabji (2004: 52).

<sup>29</sup> Cf. Sorabji (2004: 92–93).

<sup>30</sup> Ross (1906: 107), Bloch (2007: 35).

or impression, 451a12–14 clearly presupposes the description of recollection in 451a5–8. In addition, as King suggests, 451a12–14 answers the problem raised in 451a2–5.<sup>31</sup> Therefore, in contrast to Sorabji’s view, the most likely explanation is that 451a5–8 responds to 451a2–5. Accordingly, T6 may suggest that the people who do not take  $x$  as a representation of  $X$  sometimes doubt whether they are remembering and, when is in doubt, sometimes recollect.

Why does Aristotle mention people who doubt whether they are experiencing memory in T6? The passage relates to his other definition of memory, presented as follows:

T7: Memory, then, is neither sensation nor conception, but a state of having one of these or an affection resulting from one of these, when some time elapses.

(1. 449b24–25)

This is what King calls Aristotle’s “provisional definition” of memory.<sup>32</sup> But how does it relate to his final definition? According to King, the provisional definition is “the starting point of the enquiry” and is “transformed into the final definition by displaying the cause for the occurrence of memory.”<sup>33</sup> Moreover, King takes imagination as “the cause for the occurrence of memory.”<sup>34</sup> Therefore, King indicates that ( $\mu 2$ ) is part of Aristotle’s final definition of memory. Specifically, his reference to the imagination indicates that memory derives from sensation; that is, that an image is a representation of a sensation. I accept King’s interpretation and consider T6 from this point of view (King does not take up T6).<sup>35</sup> In his provisional

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<sup>31</sup> King (2004: 109).

<sup>32</sup> Cf. King (2009: 27).

<sup>33</sup> King (2009: 85–86).

<sup>34</sup> King (2009: 86). Moreover, according to King (2009: 81), while the image is a “moving cause,” “in the part of the soul involved” is the “formal cause.” I take notice of the former of them.

<sup>35</sup> One more point on difference between my interpretation and King’s is worth mentioning. According to King, the provisional and final definitions of memory (apart from the reference to representations) essentially state the same thing. The final definition is the one that “explains” the Canonical Formula “in theoretical terms” (King (2009: 81)). Hence, in King’s understanding, the Canonical Formula, the provisional definition, and the final definition are nearly synonymous. This interpretation suggests that the “ $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\ \omicron\upsilon\acute{\nu}$ ” (1. 449b24) that exists between the Canonical Formula and the provisional definition would have to be understood as indicating consequence. Indeed, King (2004: 13) translates the word as “*folglich*” (“hence” (Ross (1906: 101)), “therefore” (Beare (1908), Sorabji (2004: 48)). Cf. “thus” (Ross (1955: 235))). As I will argue later, I translate  $\mu\epsilon\mu\eta\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$  as per Bloch (2007) as “recall” and understand it to be different from memory; accordingly, unlike King, I suggest what is stated in the Canonical Formula is different from that in the provisional definition. But in this case, how are we to understand  $\mu\epsilon\acute{\nu}\ \omicron\upsilon\acute{\nu}$  to mean “consequence”? In Section 4 of this paper, I show that possession of a memory satisfying the provisional definition is



definition, Aristotle figures memory as “a state of having one of these [a sensation or a conception] or an affection resulting from one of these.” This delineation corresponds to ( $\mu 1$ ).<sup>36</sup> Nevertheless, T6 suggests that Aristotle does not reduce memory to ( $\mu 1$ ). In other words, Aristotle’s provisional definition does not account for his entire concept of memory; specifically, memory involves both ( $\mu 1$ ) and ( $\mu 2$ ).

Accordingly, if one lacks ( $\mu 2$ ), recovering a previous image ( $\pi\acute{\alpha}\theta\omicron\varsigma$ ) requires connecting the image to previous knowledge or sensations. It should be emphasized here that the *previous* image ( $\pi\acute{\alpha}\theta\omicron\varsigma$ ) and the *present* image derived from the previous sensation are not the same: the former corresponds to ( $\mu 2$ ) and the latter to ( $\mu 1$ ).

Let us look closely at this point. The provisional definition suggests that one needs a present image derived from the previous sensation—namely, ( $\mu 1$ ). On the other hand, the final definition suggests that one needs the previous image ( $\pi\acute{\alpha}\theta\omicron\varsigma$ ) — namely, ( $\mu 2$ ) —to connect ( $\mu 1$ ) to the past case. In contrast to the provisional definition, the final definition situates “memory” as dependent upon both ( $\mu 1$ ) and ( $\mu 2$ ). As T6 shows, without both, one may be in doubt as to whether the present image is a representation of a past case. In other words, although ( $\mu 1$ ) and ( $\mu 2$ ) similarly concern the image, the point in the latter is cognizing time.

### 3. Cognizing time and “recall”

In the previous section, I considered why memory involves the recovery of a previous image ( $\pi\acute{\alpha}\theta\omicron\varsigma$ ) by distinguishing between Aristotle’s provisional and final definitions of memory. In doing so, I reasoned that ( $\mu 2$ ) involves cognizing time. In this section, I further detail Aristotle’s theory of recollection by referring to “the movement of the thing” and “the movement of the time.”

Aristotle claims that when one recollects, “the most important point is that one must cognise ( $\gamma\nu\omega\rho\acute{\iota}\zeta\epsilon\iota\nu$ ) time” (2. 452b7). On the other hand, his statement that “remembering differs from recollecting not only concerning time [...]” (2. 453a6–7)<sup>37</sup> suggests that memory (or remembering) and recollection are caught up with

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presupposed in recall (with or without a recollective process). Hence, I argue that  $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu$   $\omicron\upsilon\tilde{\nu}$  indicates that the provisional definition is a necessary condition for recall. Notably, this word does not indicate that what is stated within the Canonical Formula is synonymous with the provisional definition.

<sup>36</sup> Sorabji (2004: 110) and King (2004: 140) suggest that there are cases in which memory exists in individuals demonstrating only ( $\mu 1$ ).

<sup>37</sup> In contrast to Bloch (2007: 48), I do not eliminate  $\mu\acute{o}\nu\omicron\nu$  in 453a6; it seems to me that the point is that recollection differs from memory in terms of time.

time in different ways. I argue that the former is “with” time (1. 449b28) while the latter “cognize” time.

First, Aristotle declares that cognizing time occurs “either with an exact measure (μέτρῳ) or indeterminately (ἀορίστως)” (2. 452b7–8). This measure is a “unit” (e.g., a “day”) (cf. 2. 453a2)<sup>38</sup>; specifically, Aristotle explains cognizing time with the example of magnitudes (2. 452b8–9). As he put it, “one thinks about big things [Y]” with “a proportionate movement [y],” (2. 452b9–12) for y has “similar figures and movements” to Y (2. 452b12–13). Thinking about Y and thinking about y are not different; consequently, one can think about Y with y (2. 452b13–14). Based on this treatment of magnitudes, Aristotle illustrates how to recognize time. While 452b17–22 is a notoriously difficult passage to take up,<sup>39</sup> it offers useful insights for our purposes here. Helpfully, Ross establishes that this passage presents a case in which one can recognize a past event by using an image available at hand.<sup>40</sup> To cognize time, one must already have an image. However, one can cognize time by recollecting with or without a measure, as mentioned above (cf. 2. 453a2). In addition, recollecting with a measure does not always involve cognizing time (452b30).

Aristotle says that cognizing time is crucial for recollection and discusses it in detail. Given this claim, it is notable that Aristotle advises that “remembering differs from recollecting not only concerning time [...]” (2. 453a6–7), which does not suggest that recollection is “chronologically posterior to” memory<sup>41</sup> or that “while memory remains from the past, recollection is a search from the present.”<sup>42</sup> Rather, this passage indicates that recollection not only involves time, but cognizing the amount of time.

Moreover, Aristotle claims that “when both the movement of the thing and the movement of the time occur simultaneously, then one actualises his memory (τῆ μνήμῃ ἐνεργεῖ)” (2. 452b23–24. cf. 452b26–27). This “movement” refers to an image.<sup>43</sup> While it is possible for only one movement to occur, this is not “recall (μεμνήσθαι)” (2. 452b26–29). As in T4, Aristotle seems to conflate “recall” and “actualises his memory” here.<sup>44</sup> Given this, the movement of the thing must accord with the movement of time in both cases.

<sup>38</sup> Cf. Sorabji (2004: 108), King (2004: 133).

<sup>39</sup> Bloch (2007: 240) reads the passage as “all interpretations are highly conjectural and uncertain.”

<sup>40</sup> Cf. Ross (1955: 249–252).

<sup>41</sup> Beare (1908).

<sup>42</sup> King (2009: 92, n. 389).

<sup>43</sup> Sorabji (2004: 93). Cf. King (2004: 139).

<sup>44</sup> Cf. Bloch (2007: 101–102).

To recall something and not only have an image of it, one must recognize that the image corresponds to a previous thing. This relation is rooted in Aristotle's sense that "the movement of the thing and the movement of the time occur simultaneously." Aristotle explains this in 2. 452b24–26, where he establishes that one has only the movement of a thing.<sup>45</sup> He refers to an individual who "thinks that he does, without really doing so" (2. 452b24). This is clearly a counterexample to the statement in T6 that "although one really has an image derived from the previous sensation, he cannot understand whether or not its image is derived from the previous sensation." Thus, while T6 suggests that memory can occur with ( $\mu 2$ ), 452b24–26 suggests that someone can "think [...] he remembers, when he is really not remembering" (2. 452b26). Therefore, Aristotle's statement that "the movement of the thing and the movement of the time occur simultaneously" means that the present image corresponds with the previous thing; that is, one has experiences both ( $\mu 1$ ) and ( $\mu 2$ ). In 1. 451a8–12, Aristotle reiterates his claim in 452b24–26 that one cannot have ( $\mu 2$ ). However, it is possible that an individual may not have either ( $\mu 1$ ) or ( $\mu 2$ ). In this paper, what matters is that one has the movement of a thing; that is, ( $\mu 1$ ).<sup>46</sup> In such a case, when one does not have ( $\mu 2$ ), one must connect ( $\mu 1$ ) to the past, which requires cognizing time.

Here, it is important to analyze the relationship between recollection and recall ( $\mu\epsilon\mu\nu\eta\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$ ). As suggested above, because both require cognizing time, they are likely related in terms of this crucial point. Below, I consider the relationship between recollection and recall in Aristotle; notably, my analysis troubles Bloch's interpretation, which takes recall as the starting point and endpoint of recollection.<sup>47</sup> Let us consider the following passage, which importantly includes 452a10–12.

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<sup>45</sup> Cf. Bloch (2007: 102–103).

<sup>46</sup> An example in which only the movement of time occurs would be as follows: "I remember that I have learned something, but I have no idea what it is." Such a situation, which is often seen in daily life, seems to fall outside the scope of Aristotle's theory of recollection. Of ( $\mu 1$ ) and ( $\mu 2$ ), the former is essential to memory because it is included in both the provisional and final definition. ( $\mu 2$ ) has meaning only when ( $\mu 1$ ) is present, and cannot be a memory in itself. (The provisional definition allows for the possibility of memory that satisfies only ( $\mu 1$ ). Moreover, the example of 452b24–26 suggests that the movement of time implies ( $\mu 2$ ). Therefore, "the passing of time" in the provisional definition, which was problematic for not implying it, is different from the movement of time in question.) Additionally, as we shall see later, recollection arises from memory. Therefore, a case in which only ( $\mu 2$ ) exists is irrelevant to Aristotle's theory of memory and recollection; along these lines, there is no concrete example of such a case in *De Memoria et Reminiscentia*.

<sup>47</sup> Bloch (2007: 87–88).

T8: And recollecting differs from relearning something by this that one can in a way be moved through himself to the point after the starting point. But when he cannot, and it has to happen through someone else, then he no longer recalls. But often one cannot recollect at the moment, but he can seek what he desires and then discovers it. This happens when he moves many items, until he produces the sort of movement which is followed by the thing that he seeks. For to recall is the internal presence of a moving potential (δύναμιν τὴν κινουῦσαν); and this, as has been stated, must be understood in the way that the person is moved by himself and by the movements he has.

(2. 452a4–12)

Bloch situates recall as the starting point and endpoint of recollection by combing T8 (esp. 452a10–12) with 452a13–16. The point of his interpretation is that “a moving potential” is irrelevant to remembering. According to Bloch, it is the “somewhat peculiar state of having objects present to attention without ‘remembering’ them.”<sup>48</sup> He may think that one must “forget” a memory before recollecting. Specifically, Bloch claims that when one completes the recollective process—namely, when one “recalls” an image— “this result will either be lost again or it will, in time, proceed to become a memory.”<sup>49</sup> Since memory follows recollection, recollection does not require remembering; therefore, remembering does not comprise “a moving potential.”

However, as suggested above and examined in the next section, it seems that recollection requires a prior memory. This suggests, in contrast to Bloch, that “a moving potential” in T8 refers to remembering. While I agree that μὲμνησθαι is the activity of remembering, I argue that T8 suggests that μνημονεύειν, in contrast to Sorabji’s interpretation,<sup>50</sup> is not the same as μὲμνησθαι. For, figuring μὲμνησθαι in 452a10–11 as μνημονεύειν troubles the connections between 452a10–11 and 452a11–12 or 452a12ff.

So how should we understand μὲμνησθαι? While μὲμνησθαι is not the starting point of the recollection, it is the endpoint, as Bloch says. For, Aristotle describes acquiring the movement = image to which the recollection aims as “recalling” (e.g., 2. 452a13–16). Thus, recollecting implies recalling, but not *vice versa*.<sup>51</sup> Aristotle

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<sup>48</sup> Bloch (2007: 88).

<sup>49</sup> Bloch (2007: 92).

<sup>50</sup> Sorabji (2004: 1).

<sup>51</sup> Therefore, one cannot paraphrase recalling (μὲμνησθαι) in recollecting as Michael (1903: 28, 32–29, 3) does. Cf. King (2004: 122).

says that “when a person actualises his memory for the fact that he has seen, heard or learned something, he senses in addition that he did this earlier” (1. 450a19–21).<sup>52</sup> Since, as mentioned above, “actualis[ing a] his memory” is equivalent to recalling, this excerpt suggests that one can perceive a previous sensation without the deduction peculiar to recollection (2. 453a8–14). Therefore, recall does not necessarily imply the recollective process.<sup>53</sup>

I do not think that μεμνήσθαι has mysterious content as Bloch does, nor do I take it to hold the same meaning as μνημονεύειν, as per Sorabji’s interpretation. Instead, I argue that μεμνήσθαι sometimes includes the recollective process, and sometimes does not.<sup>54</sup>

#### 4. The relationship between recollection and memory

The previous section discussed the topic of cognizing time to further explore Aristotle’s theory of recollection. Moreover, I also resituated the relation between recall and recollection in contrast to Bloch’s understanding and Sorabji’s interpretations. Based on these above considerations, this section takes up 2. 451b5–6 to analyze the relation between recollection and memory. Notably, I use this work to test the validity of my interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of recollection.

While Bloch reads 451b5–6 with many manuscripts, Ross proposes an alternative reading.

Bloch: τὸ δὲ μνημονεύειν συμβαίνει καὶ μνήμη ἀκολουθεῖ.

Ross: τῷ δὲ μνημονεύειν συμβαίνει καὶ μνήμην ἀκολουθεῖν.

Since Ross thinks that readings like Bloch’s figure μνήμη ἀκολουθεῖ as “a mere repetition” of τὸ δὲ μνημονεύειν συμβαίνει,<sup>55</sup> he, as Sakashita shows, uses the text and interpretation of Michael. Michael thinks that μνημονεύειν in 451b5–6 is actually “ἀναμνήσκουσα” and so this text means “τῇ δὲ ἀναμνήσει συμβαίνει ἀκολουθεῖν τὴν μνήμην.”<sup>56</sup> Therefore, according to Sakashita, Ross’ text is

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<sup>52</sup> Bloch cannot adequately deal with this text.

<sup>53</sup> Sorabji (2004: 99) thinks that Aristotle does not accept “recollection without search” in *De Memoria et Reminiscencia*, but acknowledges the possibility that such a thing exists.

<sup>54</sup> Sakashita (2014: 421), like me, takes a process of recall that includes an inquiry as a recollection. However, Sakashita and I have different views on the relationship between recollection and memory. See the next section of this paper.

<sup>55</sup> Ross (1955: 245).

<sup>56</sup> Michael (1903: 23, 21–24).

translated into “what is incidental to recollection is that memory follows it.”<sup>57</sup> On the other hand, while Bloch accepts the reading of many manuscripts, he claims that this text is “corrupt,” arguing that its suggestion that memory “necessarily” follows recollection “cannot be taken literally”<sup>58</sup> since it “is not strictly speaking true on the Aristotelian theory.”<sup>59</sup>

Recently, Sakashita presented an interesting interpretation on this text in response to a claim by Sorabji and King (which referred to Beare’s translation and note) that μνήμη and μνημονεύειν precede recollection.<sup>60</sup> Sakashita does not accept this interpretation. First, he answers Ross’ question by taking μνήμη as an ability and μνημονεύειν as its activity.<sup>61</sup> Next, he reasons that μνημονεύειν does not necessarily follow recollection because συμβαίνει signifies “incidental.” In step, he argues that 451b5–6 means that “sometimes one remembers the experience, not content or object, of recollecting, sometimes does not, and if he remembers it, it becomes a ἔξις as memory.” Ultimately, Sakashita finds only a loose connection between recollecting and remembering.<sup>62</sup> His translation of 451b5–6 is “remembering is incidental [to recollecting], and memory follows remembering.”<sup>63</sup>

I agree with Sakashita that Aristotle positions remembering as incidental to recollecting. However, my view on their relation differs from his own. I expand on this below. Here, it is important to note that Aristotle states the following immediately before he defines recollection in (T1).

T9: Furthermore, it is clear that one can remember (μνημονεύειν ἔστι) things, even though he has not just now recollected them, but has sensed or experienced them for the first time.

(2. 451a31–b2)

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<sup>57</sup> Sakashita (2014: 421). Annas (1992: 309–310) agrees with Ross’ revision.

<sup>58</sup> Bloch (2007: 37, n. 23).

<sup>59</sup> Cf. Bloch (2007: 234).

<sup>60</sup> Beare (1908), Sorabji (2004: 92–93), King (2004: 115).

<sup>61</sup> Cf. Michael (1903: 6, 8–10), King (2004: 79), Sorabji (2004: 64).

<sup>62</sup> This explanation is based on Sakashita (2014: 421–423). Regarding his interpretation of the relationship between memory and recollection, see Sakashita (2014: 420–421).

<sup>63</sup> Sakashita (2014: 273).

T9 establishes that one can remember something by perceiving or experiencing it even without recollection.<sup>64</sup> Along these lines, Aristotle argues that animals, which he states cannot recollect, do have memory (2. 453a7–9, cf. *HA*. I 1. 488b24–26).

Accordingly, it is possible that by “remember[ing]” (memory) in T9, Aristotle means memory that satisfies either the conditions of his provisional or final definitions. The former may be not a perfect kind of memory because it does not satisfy ( $\mu 2$ ), as per the final definition. As I suggest above, if one has only an image,  $x$ , and cannot connect it to the past thing,  $X$ , then one must recollect the previous sensation or experience of  $X$ . Since recollection involves *recovering* an image ( $\pi\acute{\alpha}\theta\omicron\varsigma$ ) of a previous sensation or knowledge, recollection requires a memory that satisfies the conditions of the provisional definition<sup>65</sup>—having such a memory implies having an image *derived from a previous sensation*. Accordingly, I argue that T9 gives the necessary condition for recollection.

Notably, this line of thought suggests that recollection connects the conditions of the provisional and final definitions. This interpretation does not violate the principle that “recollection is neither the recovery of memory, nor the original acquisition of it” (2. 451a20–21) because it situates recollection as recovering only an image ( $\pi\acute{\alpha}\theta\omicron\varsigma$ ) of a previous sensation or knowledge. However, if, as I reason in the previous section, recollection implies “actualis[ing] [...] his memory,” then memory is necessary for recollection. My interpretation maintains that an individual attempting to recollect something has a memory satisfying the conditions of provisional definitions.

Next, I apply my interpretation to a reading of 451b5–6. First, I agree with Bloch’s reading of this text. For, as Sorabji shows, it is difficult to accept the text and interpretation of Michael.<sup>66</sup> However, if Bloch’s reading is accepted, one must reply to Ross’ critique of “a mere repetition.” Then, I think with Sakashita and consider whether remembering ( $\mu\nu\eta\mu\omicron\nu\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\epsilon\iota\nu$ ) and memory ( $\mu\nu\acute{\eta}\mu\eta$ ) are different and whether the latter follows the former.<sup>67</sup> This interpretation can solve the above problem suggested by Ross. According to Sakashita, the relation between memory and recollection is as follows.

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<sup>64</sup> Cf. Sorabji (2004: 92–93), King (2009: 95).

<sup>65</sup> Although unlike me, Annas does not notice of the difference between memory that satisfies the different conditions of the provisional and final definition, she claims that “what I remember in the broad sense” is necessary for recollecting (1992: 310, n. 21).

<sup>66</sup> Sorabji (2004: 92–93). Cf. King (2004: 115).

<sup>67</sup> Sakashita (2014: 423).

recollection → remembering & memory

He claims that remembering is the first actuality and memory is the second potentiality.<sup>68</sup> Since the first actuality and second potentiality are almost the same,<sup>69</sup> Sakashita may think that it is the case that memory arises from remembering, but they occur almost simultaneously.

However, in Sakashita's interpretation, it follows that one recollects "the experience of recollecting" which is suddenly introduced. Moreover, although he claims that recollection as a second actuality arises from memory as a second potentiality (remembering as a first actuality),<sup>70</sup> this does not successfully explain the function of "recover" in the definition of recollection. For, something must be lacking for recovery, but what is lacking here is unclear.

In contrast to Sakashita (and the other researchers), I think that memory that satisfies the conditions of the provisional definition is different from memory in the final definition, and that recollecting connects the former to the latter. Accordingly, my interpretation suggests that the relation between memory and recollection is as follows.

remembering & memory (satisfying the conditions of the provisional definition) →

recollection → remembering & memory (satisfying the conditions of the final definition)

In my interpretation, since ( $\mu_2$ ) is the object of recollection and of remembering and memory (satisfying the conditions of the final definition), I need not "the experience of recollecting" which is not included in *De Memoria et Reminiscentia*.

Moreover, if we accept the distinction between actuality and potentiality, and we want to deal with the feature of recoverability in recollection, then recollection as

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<sup>68</sup> For example, taking a knower as an example, the first possibility is a child who has not acquired knowledge, the first actuality or the second possibility is one who has actually acquired knowledge and can exercise it at any time, and the second actuality is one who is actually exercising that knowledge (contemplating) (cf. *de An.* II 5. 417a21–b2). Since this distinction in *De Anima* may be applied "strictly to the realm of cognition and things linked closely to it," as Polansky (2007: 231) shows, I examine memory as a cognitive faculty from this perspective.

<sup>69</sup> Cf. Hicks (1907: 354).

<sup>70</sup> Sakashita (2014: 421).



a second actuality, which arises from memory as a second possibility, would have to recover something—namely, ( $\mu_2$ ) (the possibility of recovering of ( $\mu_1$ ) was eliminated in the previous section).<sup>71</sup> Therefore, my interpretation involving the distinction between memory satisfying the conditions of the provisional definition and the final definitions can successfully explain the meaning of “recover” in the definition of recollection, which is another problem with Sakashita’s interpretation.

Next, I consider the content of this incidental relationship between recollection and memory (in the following, remembering and memory are collectively referred to as “memory”). The following passage, located immediately before the final definition of memory (T2), offers insights into this incidental relationship.

T10 : Now, exercises preserve the memory by *ἐπαναμμνήσκειν*; and this is nothing else than often contemplating the image as a representation and not as something in itself.

(1. 451a12–14)

Ross and Sorabji do not comment on T10.<sup>72</sup> Moreover, most scholars translate *ἐπαναμμνήσκειν* into “remind,” and seem to think that it is different from *ἀνάμνησις* (recollection) and *ἀναμμνήσκεσθαι* (recollect).<sup>73</sup> However, I think this term is equivalent to *ἀνάμνησις* and so must be translated into “the act of recollection” (G. Ross) or “Erinnern” (King).<sup>74</sup> Notably, immediately before T10, Aristotle says that recollecting (*ἀναμνησθῆναι*) occurs “when, contemplating something (image) as something in itself, you make a switch and contemplate it as a representation of something else” (1. 451a7–8). Accordingly, T10 suggests that a

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<sup>71</sup> I think that recollection is a second actuality of memory that satisfies the conditions of the provisional definition. However, just as memory that satisfies the conditions of the provisional definition has recollection as a second actuality, does not memory that satisfies the conditions of the final definition have recollection as a second actuality? That does not seem to be the case. This is because, due to the characteristic of recollection that involves recovering what is lacking, it is difficult to imagine that recollection is initiated from a memory satisfying the conditions of the final definition, where noting is lacking. Rather, the possibility of losing ( $\mu_2$ ) again after acquiring a memory satisfying the conditions of the final definition would be more conceivable. What begins there is still recollection as a second actuality of memory satisfying the conditions of the provisional definition. Therefore, I do not think there is a kind of recollection as a second actuality of memory that satisfies the conditions of the final definition.

<sup>72</sup> Ross (1955: 239), Sorabji (2004: 87).

<sup>73</sup> Beare (1908), Annas (1992: 308), Sorabji (2004: 52), Bloch (2007: 35). Cf. Ross (1955: 237).

<sup>74</sup> Ross (1906: 107), King (2004: 16). However, King explains in his translation that *Erinnern* is “Das Wiederholt-ins-Gedächtnis-Rufen.” Cf. Sakashita (2014: 271).

single recollection is insufficient to establish memory. Rather, memory is established by repeatedly recognizing an image as a representation of a particular thing; that is, by repeatedly recollecting. People who cannot fix their own memory cannot establish an image,  $x$ , as a representation of a thing,  $X$ . Such peoples have  $(\mu 1)$ , but not  $(\mu 2)$ . In short, memory proceeds from continuous recollection. Because memory only follows this particular practice of recollection, it is not the case that memory “necessarily” follows recollection more generally.

Annas distinguishes between “what constitutes memory” and “what is evidence for it,” and states that “personal memory” has both, while “non-personal memory” has only the former.<sup>75</sup> She claims that because personal memory cannot be “improve[d]” in Aristotle, T10 does not suggest that  $(\mu 2)$  is acquired through recollection.<sup>76</sup>

Annas’ interpretation does not assume that recollection is rooted in the corresponding relationship between the movement of a thing and time. Perhaps, Annas reasons this from 2. 452b23–24, since she thinks that  $\mu\epsilon\mu\nu\eta\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$  and  $\tau\eta\ \mu\eta\eta\mu\eta\ \acute{\epsilon}\nu\epsilon\rho\gamma\epsilon\acute{\iota}$  belong to memory but not recollection. But how may her reading make sense of 452b7, which advises that recollection requires cognizing time? While Annas takes cognizing time as “a question arising for both memory and recollection,”<sup>77</sup> the previous section shows that cognizing time is peculiar to recollection. In addition, her interpretation that recollection is not connected with  $(\mu 2)$  cannot explain the description of  $(\mu 2)$  in the latter part of T6 (451a5–8). Moreover, Annas claims that 2. 453a10–11, which may not align with her interpretation, suggests that one “infer[s]” a past experience (from which an image is derived) through recollecting an image.<sup>78</sup> However, if a recollection is connected “indirectly” to a particular past, then one need not doubt one’s memory, which is a concern in T6. If Annas’ interpretation is correct, an individual with a present image should be able to “infer” a past experience through the image.<sup>79</sup> Therefore, in contrast to Annas, I think that the essential function of the recollection is to connect the individual to their past experience.<sup>80</sup>

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<sup>75</sup> Annas (1992: 299). Personal memory corresponds to episodic memory and non-personal memory to semantic memory.

<sup>76</sup> Annas (1992: 307–308).

<sup>77</sup> Annas (1992: 298). Cf. Ross (1906: 275), Sorabji (2004: 108).

<sup>78</sup> Annas (1992: 310, n. 21).

<sup>79</sup> Annas may follow Ross (1955: 252) here. According to Ross, one can “infer” that “this *φάντασμα* must have a cause in previous experience” from the major premise that *φάντασμα* is generally derived from a previous experience and the minor premise that one has a *φάντασμα*.

<sup>80</sup> Cf. Annas (1992: 311).

Above, I suggest that memory sometimes follows recollection and sometimes does not. Since this approach to memory satisfies the conditions of the final definition, memory “incidentally” follows recollection. On the other hand, as I showed in Section 2 of this paper, recollection sometimes follows memory and sometimes does not. Since this approach to memory satisfies the conditions of provisional definition, it also situates recollection as incidentally following memory. This interpretation establishes that Aristotle’s theory of recollection explains 451b5–6.

### Conclusion

*De Memoria et Reminiscentia* suggests at least three ways of acquiring a memory that satisfy the conditions of Aristotle’s final definition of memory.

(1) previous knowledge or sensation → an image occurs → formation of a memory satisfying the conditions of the final definition

(2) previous knowledge or sensation → an image occurs → formation of a memory satisfying the conditions of the provisional definition → doubt about the memory → recall → the memory satisfies the conditions of the final definition

(3) previous knowledge or sensation → an image occurs → formation of a memory satisfying the conditions of the provisional definition → doubt about the memory → recall with the recollective process → the memory satisfies the conditions of the final definition

Because, for Aristotle, animals do not doubt their memories and cannot recollect, their only route to memory is (1). I argue that Aristotle’s theory of recollection in *De Memoria et Reminiscentia* presents more routes to memory that can be taken by human beings. Specifically, the text suggests that because humans sometimes doubt memory and can recollect, they can experience all three routes to memory.

Finally, I turn to the significance of the conclusion of this paper by applying Aristotle’s theory of recollection to his overall epistemology. In *Metaphysics*, Aristotle says, “and from memory experience is produced in men; for many memories of the same thing produce finally the capacity for a single experience” (*Metaph. A 1. 980b28–981a1*).<sup>81</sup> This passage claims that human beings can acquire an experience from memory, for they can have “many memories of the same thing” (cf. *APst. II 19. 100a3–6*). I argue that human beings can have many memories

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<sup>81</sup> This passage from *Metaphysics* is from Ross (1984).

because they have access to the three routes to memory listed above. Having many routes increases the possibility of exercising memory. Moreover, because Route (3) includes the recollective process, individuals can practice this route by frequently recalling objects with so-called “mnemonic techniques” (cf. 2. 452a12–b7).<sup>82</sup> This practice of recall or recollection notably connects memory to experience.

My work herein may be debated along the following lines. If my interpretation is correct, since only humans can practice recall and recollection, one may expect that the experience it yields also belongs only to human beings; however, Aristotle suggests that some animals have experiences (*Metaph.* A 1. 980b26–27). Against this potential counter, one may argue that only human beings can have experience, as per Alexander of Aphrodisias.<sup>83</sup> However, as Ross says, in *Metaphysics* A 1 having an art distinguishes man from other animals, and “[...] in point of fact the acquired instincts of animals exhibit the characteristics of experience [...]”; thus, Aristotle does not accept that animals cannot have experience.<sup>84</sup> This suggests that it is possible to have an experience without recollecting. Perhaps, in that case, one will be able to come to have an experience from memories that could only be acquired through Route (1). However, I think that the Routes (2) and (3), which are related to intelligence, are crucial in terms of generating experiences that can develop into sciences or arts.<sup>85</sup> The connection between recollection unique to humans and experience is shown in Aristotle’s belief that humans obviously have experiences while non-human animals rarely have experiences. To be sure, experience will not always follow recollection. However, recollection may enable humans to have different kinds of experiences than other animals.

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<sup>82</sup> For a detailed discussion of mnemonic techniques, see Sorabji (2004: 22–34).

<sup>83</sup> Alexander (1891: 4, 13–26).

<sup>84</sup> Ross (1924: 117). Cf. Gregorić and Grgić (2006: 4, n. 12).

<sup>85</sup> One may also distinguish between lower and higher experiences as Gregorić and Grgić (2006) do. Their work suggests that human beings can acquire higher experiences because of the intellectual act of recollection. Although they also focus on recollection in relation to experience (Gregorić and Grgić (2006: 10, n. 23)), their discussion differs from that presented in this paper.

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