

Clitophon's Challenge and the *Aporia* of Socratic Protreptic*

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Before I discuss the text in detail, I would like to briefly sketch the main line of arguments in the *Clitophon* which I am going to take up, just for the sake of *anamnēsis* of the readers :

In the opening scene Socrates speaks to Clitophon in the third person and tells him that he heard from somebody else that Clitophon, in his conversation with Lysias, has criticised Socratic *diatribai* (pursuits), whereas he has lavishly praised his *synousia* (association) with Thrasymachus. Taking Socrates' words as a sort of disguised criticism or complaint, Clitophon answers that the story was only half true, because although he did on the one hand criticise Socrates, he also on the other hand highly praised him. Then, he explains to Socrates why he must take such an ambiguous attitude towards him.

In the first half of his speech he focuses on the aspect of Socratic teaching which he admires unreservedly, namely Socrates' protreptic speech towards virtues. Here he refers to a lot of Socratic dicta which remind us of well known passages in the early dialogues of Plato.

By contrast, in the latter half Clitophon explains where his deep frustration with Socrates lies. He says that, being already converted by Socratic protreptic and resolved to pursue virtues, what he expects now from Socrates is "what comes next", that is a detailed account of the essence of virtues to be acquired and a piece of concrete advice on how to acquire them. But to these - Clitophon complains - neither Socrates' company nor Socrates himself gives any convincing answer. So, he says, finding himself in a real *aporia*, he visits Thrasymachus as well, and is also ready to go to anyone else.

At the end of the dialogue Clitophon says to Socrates, "To those who are not yet converted by you to seek virtues, you are of tremendous value, but to those who are already converted, you are even a stumbling-block to reaching the perfect virtues and becoming happy."

A former professor of ancient philosophy at Tokyo university once wrote as follows:

Even though he [Socrates] reproves and refutes common people's way of life

and exhorts them to live in an authentic way, is it not the case that he himself cannot really grasp its content and only reproduces the teachers of virtues who exhort in vain others to give up their way of living? This is exactly what the *Clitophon* points out. The criticism addressed to Socrates by Clitophon stabs curiously deep into my heart.¹

This “confession” seems to me not to be merely an expression of that scholar’s all too personal idiosyncrasy: I suppose this kind of feeling is shared by not a few scholars or students at least at some stage of their reading Socratic dialogues.

In the following, I mean to re-examine the content of the statements made by Clitophon in the eponymous dialogue, and to point out some profound problems contained in Socratic protreptic.

I shall focus mainly on the following points:

First, I shall clarify what Clitophon actually demands from Socrates in the eponymous dialogue.

Second, I shall sketch how Socrates is depicted in it.

Third, I shall examine the legitimacy of Clitophon's demands from an intertextual viewpoint, taking into account both aporetic dialogues and what I call “euporetic”² dialogues like the *Crito* and the *Gorgias*.

Fourth and finally, I shall take up the vexed problem of authorship, reviewing the representative views about it and making some provisional suggestions.

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¹ Tadashi Inoue, Plato’s picture of Socrates in *The Spot of Philosophy* (in Japanese), Keiso Shobo, 1980, 17. Hugh Benson also expresses his deep sympathy with Clitophon in *Clitophon’s Challenge: Dialectic in Plato’s Meno, Phaedo, and Republic*, Draft: July 2012, p.5. His project is much more comprehensive in its scope than mine and is still ongoing, but his cardinal question seems to be how Socrates or Plato can answer Clitophon’s challenge without discounting Socrates’ disavowal of knowledge at the same time. His focus is on the method of hypothesis, but it remains to be seen what his conclusion will be in his book forthcoming from Oxford UP.

² Bowe distinguishes “aporetic” dialogues from “constructive” ones, but by the latter he refers only to the *Republic*. G. S. Bowe, In Defence of Clitophon, *Classical Philology* 102(2007), 259.

1. What does Clitophon demand from Socrates ?

Clitophon expresses his demands in various forms, as follows:

① “O you most distinguished gentleman, what are we actually to make of Socrates' exhorting of us to pursue virtue? Are we to believe that this is all there is, and that it is impossible to pursue the matter further and grasp it fully? Will this be our life-long work, simply to convert to the pursuit of virtues those who have not yet been converted so that they in turn may convert others?” (408d3-6)³

This is really a question which ‘stabs deep into our heart’, exactly as Prof. Inoue wrote. What Clitophon requires here is to go beyond mere exhortation to *aretē* and “to grasp it fully.”

② “Even if we agree that this is what a man should do, should we not also ask Socrates, and each other, what the next step is? How should we begin to learn what justice is? What do we say?” (408d7-e3)

What is demanded here is the way they should begin to attain virtue.

③ “Don't just give me the name [i.e. *dikaiosynē*]; try it this way. Medicine is surely a kind of skill. It has two results: it produces other doctors in addition to those who are already doctors, and it produces health. Of these, the second result is not itself a skill, but rather the product of a skill, the product we call ‘health’; the skill itself is what teaches and what's taught. Likewise, carpentry has as its results a house and carpentry itself; the first is the product while the second is what's taught. Let's assume that one result of justice is also to produce just men, just as in the case of each of the skills a goal is to produce men with that skill – but what, then, are we to call the other thing, the product which the just man produces for us? Tell me.”(409a7-c1)

Here Clitophon, applying the craft analogy which we are familiar with from Plato's early dialogues, divides the effects (*ta apoteloumena*) of arts into two categories, namely

(a) the product (*ergon*)

³ The English translation is F.J., Gonzalez' in *Plato Complete Works* ed. by Cooper. & Hutchinson, Hackett, 1997.

(b) what is taught (*didagma*), and asks a man with ‘the sharpest brain’ among Socrates’ circle for the peculiar *ergon* of justice.

Though Clitophon himself does not make it explicit how these demands relate to each other, this ③ could be regarded as the detailed explanation of what was required in ①.

④ “And that is why, I suppose, I *go*⁴ to Thrasy-machus and to anyone else I can; I’m at a loss (*aporōn*). But if you’re finally ready to stop exhorting me with speeches – I mean, if it had been about gymnastics that you were exhorting me, saying that I must not neglect my body, you would have proceeded to give me what comes next after such an exhortation, namely, an explanation of the nature of my body and of the particular kind of treatment this nature requires – that’s the kind of thing you should do now.” (410c6-d5)

Based on the analogy of physical training (*gymnastikē*) and justice, Clitophon requires Socrates here to give him a piece of concrete advice on what to do which will correspond to the nature of his soul. This is a more practical and particular demand than that made in ① or ③, which are more general in character, and seems to be related to what is asked for in ②. But the demand made in ② is rather vague and general, and it is not very clear whether Clitophon wants to have (a) a general method for reaching the end, that is to know the essence of *aretē*, particularly *dikaiosynē*, and to acquire it, or (b) a piece of more particular individual advice, applicable mainly or only to him, or (c) both of these.

In any case, be it general or particular or both, what he demands is to be told ‘what comes next’ - which need not necessarily be a single step, but could be several. So, we could summarise Clitophon’s demands (CD) in rather general terms as follows;

CD1: The explicit explanation of the essence of *dikaiosynē* through showing its differentia.

CD2: a piece of concrete advice as to how to reach *dikaiosynē* so defined, with possible modification according to different individual *ēthos*, if necessary.

⁴ Burnet adopts the reading of A² which reads not A’s present form “poreuomai”, but the future form “poreusomai”. I prefer the present because the fact that Clitophon praised Thrasy-machus in his conversation with Lysias means that he had already gone to Thrasy-machus. See also S.R. Slings, *Plato Clitophon*, Cambridge, 1999, 329-330.

In this connection the simile of *kybernētikē* might help our understanding of Clitophon's two demands. In the case of the art of steering too, one would need two things:

K1: Knowledge of the destination, that is, which port the ship should head for.

K2: Knowledge of how to steer and control the ship to reach the destination.

K1 is analogous to CD1,

K2 is analogous to CD2.

Clitophon is eager to know both, but he complains that Socrates gives him no answer to either. So he wonders why Socrates does not teach him what he wants to know, and here he thinks of two possibilities:

Either

S1: "You [Socrates] don't know it [justice]."

or

S2: "You don't wish to share it with me." (410c5-6)

He says he still suspends the final judgement between these, and urges Socrates to make his attitude clear. But, before we go to examine the legitimacy of Clitophon's demands, I would like to highlight the features of Socrates depicted by Clitophon in this dialogue by comparing them with the picture of Socrates depicted in Plato's early dialogues.

2. What features does Socrates have in the *Clitophon*?

Socrates here should be differentiated into the following three figures:

Socrates 1 (Sc1): the Socrates in the opening frame dialogue, who *directly* speaks to Clitophon.

Socrates 2 (Sc2): the Socrates *indirectly* portrayed by Clitophon.

Socrates 3 (Sc3): the Socrates we find in the early dialogues of Plato.

Now, most of the thoughts put into the mouth of Sc2, except for Polemarchus' thesis on justice (point P8 in the following list), can be regarded as basically of the same character and tone as those of Sc3.

For instance,

P1. Reproof of common people's way of life and value system (407b1-c6) corresponds to *Apology* 29d7-30b4.

P2. Socrates' paradox and the denial of *akrasia* (407d2-e2) corresponds to *Protagoras* 345d9-e4, 352d4-357e8; (*Timaeus* 86d3-e3⁵)

⁵ I owe this reference to the *Timaeus* passage to David Sedley though the work is not regarded as "early" and the explanation of *akrasia* there seems to be rather physiological than to be logical

- P3. The primacy of soul to body (407e5-8) corresponds to *Apology* 30a7-b2 and *Crito* 47d7-48a4.
- P4. The essential importance of knowing how to use things and of expert knowledge (407e8-408b5) corresponds to *Euthydemus* 280b7-282a7.
- P5. The function of Socrates' speech, that of awakening people from sleep (408c3-4), corresponds to *Apology* 30e1-31a1.
- P6. The craft analogy and the essential importance of justice (408e3-409a6) correspond to *Republic* I 332d2ff.
- P7. Friendship (*philia*) as the product of justice (409d2-6) corresponds to *Republic* I 351d4-6.
- P8. Justice as 'to harm enemies and benefit friends' (410a8-b1) corresponds to *Republic* I 332d7-9.
- P9. The absolute rejection of harming (410b1-3) corresponds to *Crito* 49a4-b7, *Gorgias* 469c1-2 and *Republic* I 335d11-13.

Strictly speaking, in this dialogue P6 and P7 are given by Sc2's companions, but in *Republic* I they are propounded by Socrates, namely Sc3 himself.

The most problematic point is P8, which is said to be propounded by Sc2, whereas in *Republic* I it is Polemarchus who advocates this traditional view of justice, whereas Socrates (Sc3) strongly opposes it.

I shall take this point up again in my final section, when we discuss the authorship problem.

By contrast, Sc1 seems to manifest ambiguous traits which are both in tune and out of tune with Sc3. First of all, as Schleiermacher points out, the way in which Socrates speaks to Clitophon does not fit the image of Sc3. According to Schleiermacher, Socrates' opening address, in which he speaks of Clitophon in the third person and complains of being maligned by him in terms that lead Clitophon to infer that he is offended, is quite un-Platonic.⁶ I share this impression and cannot

whereas the explanations given in the *Clitophon* and the *Protagoras* are essentially logical. Still it shows the continuity of Socratic-Platonic interest in *akrasia*. As for the question how good or bad the argument summarised by Clitophon might be, that depends solely on the validity of his inference in a question form "οὐκοῦν καὶ τοῦτο ἀκούσιον, εἴπερ τὸ νικᾶν ἐκούσιον;" (407d6-7), which Slings and Bailly regard as more or less invalid. Cf. Slings, *ibid.*, 159, 285; J.A. Bailly, *Plato's Euthyphro & Clitophon*, Focus Publishing, 2003, 133. I am now inclined to take it to be valid because in the case of win or lose nobody would choose a draw in advance of a game or a fight.

⁶ Schleiermacher, *Platon* II-3, 1826 (zweite verbesserte Auflage), 459: "Schon der Anfang, dass Sokrates den Kleitophon, der noch dazu allein als anwesend aufgeführt wird, in der dritten Person anspricht, und sich über seine Zurücksetzung auf eine solche Art beklagt, dass Kleitophon ihm sagen kann, er sei offenbar empfindlich, schon dies ist ganz unplatonisch."

agree with Grube's assumption of a smiling Socrates⁷ which seems to underrate Socrates' (Sc1) disguised unpleasantness as perceived by Clitophon.

On the other hand, Sc1's response to Clitophon's reaction looks of the same character as Sc3. He says, "By all means; it would be shameful for me not to submit to you when your intention is to help me; for clearly, once I know my good and bad points, I will make it my practice to pursue and develop the former while ridding myself of the latter to the extent that I am able." (407a1-4)

This almost corresponds to what Sc3 says in the *Gorgias* 458a1-b1, and could be regarded as basically Platonic.

As we saw above, if Sc2 and at least half of Sc1 basically correspond to Sc3, this fact seems to suggest strongly that the main target of the author's criticism is directed to Sc3, the Socrates of Plato's early dialogues. This also seems to be of significance with regard to the question of authorship.

3. Is the demand made by Clitophon legitimate?

On this, there seem to be three options.

A: Clitophon's demand (CD) is legitimate because he rightly sees the dangerous consequence of Socratic protreptic being merely protreptic and leaving the young at a loss without giving any further positive guidance.

B1: CD is illegitimate because he understands neither Socrates' maieutic role (as made explicit in the *Theaetetus*, but arguably already portrayed in the *Meno*) nor the meaning of philosophizing in a Socratic sense, that is, continuing to examine oneself and others through elenchus. Therefore, ironically, it is likely that the second alternative Clitophon himself lists (S2) is the case, that is, he has not been selected as someone qualified to be told by Socrates anything more than mere protreptic, even if that were simply to be told that philosophizing is not getting a ready made answer from somebody else, but the process of cross-examination itself.

B2 : CD is illegitimate because Socrates actually does answer Clitophon, namely by offering a definite practical principle, the absolute rejection of doing injustice (*adikein*).

B1 appears to be convincing, but there are two points which could be counted as counterarguments. First, in view of the similar demand made by Glaucon –

⁷ Cf. G. M. A. Grube, The "Clitophon" of Plato, *Classical Philology* 26(1931),306.

famous as ‘Glaucon’s challenge’ - in *Republic* II, it is highly likely that Plato himself felt some uneasiness or insufficiency about the aporetic ending of the first book, which undoubtedly stands in a close connection with the *Clitophon*. As Nussbaum points out⁸, we are not quite sure what way of life Polemarchus would have chosen thereafter if *Republic* I had ended as it does without any following Books. He might have taken such a course as is described in Book VII as the one that those young would choose who lost their faith in traditional values through the practice of indiscriminate elenchus. In this regard it is most interesting that also in the *Clitophon* Thrasymachus is named by Clitophon just after Clitophon confesses that he finds himself in *aporia*, much as in *Republic* I Thrasymachus appears on the stage just after the traditional view of justice propounded by Polemarchus has been refuted and both Socrates and Polemarchus find themselves in *aporia*⁹.

This structural similarity between the two seems to suggest the possibility that the Socratic elenchus and Thrasymachus’ teaching formed a real alternative, especially to the intelligent and serious young who were inquiring honestly as to how they should live (*pōs biōteon*). Indeed, if it were not the case, both dramatic and philosophical tension peculiar to this work in spite of its unusual shortness would be lost, and accordingly its charm, so to speak, as well. Like the misanthrope described in *the Phaedo* (89d1-e3), the more seriously they take Socrates’ protreptic, and the more eagerly they seek to acquire virtues, without finding out how to do so successfully, the deeper will be their disappointment and the more they will become inclined to follow Thrasymachus’ teaching. For this reason, B1 would not be satisfying from Clitophon’s standpoint.

Secondly, as for Clitophon’s qualification, it should be noted that in the *Apology* Socrates tells the jury quite explicitly that he is not in the least selective as to those with whom he converses on virtue (Plato, *Apol.* 30a2-5), and it is in the

⁸ She writes: “We wonder what Polemarchus would have thought about justice had the rest of the *Republic* not followed. Would he have become the man described so graphically by Plato in the epigraph to this paper?” The epigraph is the quotation from the *Republic* 538d-e. M. Nussbaum, ‘Aristophanes and Socrates on Learning Practical Wisdom’, *Yale Classical Studies* 26 (1980), 63.

⁹ On this point, Myles Burnyeat called my attention to the fact that in Plato’s *Phaedrus* (257b3-4) Polemarchus’ passion for philosophy is highly praised and also in Plutarch’s *de esu carnium* (998b5-6) he is even called “the philosopher”, and disagreed with my observation that Polemarchus finds himself in *aporia* here. It is true that one could regard the refutation of his traditional view of justice by Socrates as purging him of a false conception and as a preparatory step indispensable for the correct understanding to be acquired, but I am not sure yet how seriously we could take those comments or descriptions on Polemarchus in the *Phaedrus* or Plutarch’s book, so I would like to limit myself to the textual evidence available from *Republic* I alone.

main part of the *Republic* that the most straightforward selection principle among the future citizens of the ideal state is introduced. In view of these two points, B1 seems to be not very convincing.

In my view, B2 deserves serious consideration: Socrates does answer Clitophon, namely by offering a definite practical principle, the absolute rejection of doing injustice.¹⁰ It is true that in the *Crito* Socrates (Sc3) consciously or unconsciously formulates something like a practical syllogism as follows:

Major premise: One should never do injustice,

Minor premise: Socrates' escaping from the jail is *a* doing injustice,

Conclusion: Socrates should not escape.¹¹

By using this syllogism, he was able to answer the question how he should behave in a particular situation, and with it he succeeded in persuading his old friend Crito, who had been eager to persuade Socrates to escape. It might be something like this that Clitophon also demands from Socrates. Maybe we could regard Crito as a kind of Clitophon who also needs Socrates' guidance to find an answer. Still, it seems to me that B2 cannot satisfy CD either, so long as Socrates (Sc3) offers no definition of injustice itself, either in the *Crito* or in the *Gorgias*. For provided that an already 'exhorted' (*protetrammenos*) Clitophon agrees to the major premise, the absolute rejection of doing injustice, what is necessary for him next would be to find out the correct minor premise, for instance that to kill an innocent person is unjust. But to find such a premise we would need the definition of injustice as a criterion. Actually, the definition of injustice too is given via that of justice for the first time in *Republic* IV even if the definition given there might be taken to be still provisional¹². From all this I am inclined to agree with option A: Clitophon's demand is legitimate.

4. Is the *Clitophon* Plato's work ?

¹⁰ For instance, Kazuo Kojima argues that Socrates does answer Clitophon's demand by his principle of "following the best argument available" (μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ πείθεσθαι ἢ τῷ λόγῳ ὃς ἂν μοι λογιζομένῳ βέλτιστος φαίνηται): Kazuo Kojima, 'Answer to Cleitophon', *Studies in Humanities*, Gakushuin University, Vol.12, 2003, 1-24. He emphasizes the piecemeal and provisional character of Socratic decision-making, but 'the best logos' in the *Crito* seems to be based on the rather embarrassing "parent analogy" and Socrates in the aporetic dialogues (Sc3) at least does not suggest any best logos which can lead to an answer to any of the definitional questions or to certain decision-making, for instance whether two sons should learn fighting in armor.

¹¹ I got this idea from Frankena's classic textbook on ethics, though my formulation is more simple and different. Cf. W. Frankena, *Ethics*, Prentice Hall, 1963, 1-5, esp., "An example of ethical thinking (Socrates)".

¹² Cf. for instance, C. Rowe, *The Place of the Republic in Plato's Political Thought*, in G. R. F. Ferrari (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Plato's Republic*. Cambridge 2007, 52.

Finally, I would like to take up the vexed problem of authorship, picking up the representative views suggested by scholars before and after Slings' Cambridge edition.

I would like to begin with George Grote. Grote took up the *Clitophon* in his book on Plato and regarded it as genuine work of Plato. Still, he takes it to be 'a sketch or fragment never worked out', but with strong potential. He says, 'When I read the Kleitophon, I am not surprised that Plato never brought it to a conclusion, nor ever provided Socrates with an answer to the respectful, yet emphatic, requisition of Kleitophon. The case against Socrates has been made so strong, that I doubt whether Plato himself could have answered it to his own satisfaction.'¹³

The next scholar in English-speaking world I would like to mention is G. M. A. Grube. His article on the *Clitophon* is as short as other papers on this dialogue tend to be, but very informative and illuminating, though I cannot agree with his conclusion on authorship. There he gives a fair review of the history of scholarship and debates on this dialogue since antiquity, including its authorship with many acute comments. He himself takes the dialogue to be written by Plato after *Republic* I and before II, but he also examines the possibility that it was written by someone else. In this connection it is interesting that he rejects Wilamowitz's idea, saying 'To suggest, as Wilamowitz does, that the *Cleitophon* is a bad answer to the *Republic*, written by a pupil who had not taken the trouble to read through that work, is surely highly fanciful; such a pupil would have been a laughingstock in that very distinguished school, and I fail to see how his handiwork could have come to be included among the works of the master.'¹⁴ Instead of this 'dull pupil of Wilamowitz', he thinks of 'some bright pupil' who so impressively criticized his master after reading the separately published first book of the *Republic* that his master had to 'mend his ways forever after.'¹⁵

Next, from the German speaking world, I would like to mention Schleiermacher, Brünnecke and Geffcken.

As we have already seen, Schleiermacher regards the dialogue in question as spurious and supposes 'that the dialogue, coming from one of the best rhetorical schools, is directed against Socrates and the Socratics in general, not excluding

¹³ G. Grote, *Plato and the Other Companions of Socrates*, 1865, 20-21.

¹⁴ Grube, op.cit., 303 -304. Wilamowitz takes the work to be spurious, but he admits its importance and its influence on Plato. He writes "Unter Platons Schriften hat sich ein kleiner Dialog eingedrängt, der als seine Antwort auf den Staat und Phaidros wertvoll ist. Vergessen wir nicht, dass Platon Erfahrungen gemacht haben musste, als er von den Gefahren der schonungslosen wissenschaftlichen Kritik sprach, Staat 539b." U. v. Wilamowitz Moellendorff, *Platon* I, 490.n.5.

¹⁵ Grube, op.cit., 305.

Plato.¹⁶

By contrast Brünnecke takes the dialogue to be genuine, and insists that the Socrates criticised there is not Plato's Socrates, but Anthisthenes',¹⁷ whereas Geffcken thinks the Socrates criticized by Clitophon is "der Platonische Sokrates", Plato's Socrates, and regards his criticism as coming from a basically Aristotelian standpoint which not only recognises the importance of protreptic, but also emphasizes its praxis.¹⁸

By surveying these interpreters we can easily recognise how diverse their opinions are, and the difficulty of finding any decisive answer to the question.

As is well known, even Slings has changed his opinion about this, that is from regarding the work as spurious in his dissertation, to then regarding it as authentic in his Cambridge edition¹⁹. But we can imagine how great his hesitation was from the following words in which he compares his change of mind with that of Paul Shorey:

From what Shorey goes on to say it becomes quite clear that he regards the *Clitophon* as spurious. Over the years my position has become the exact opposite: the balance which I have drawn in this section causes me to claim that the *Clitophon* is, after all, authentic. But I am less confident a scholar than Shorey had the right to be.²⁰

According to Bowe, it is not only Slings who changed his mind. The scholars listed by him as having done the same are Ficino and A.E. Taylor, as well as Shorey, who is cited for this by Slings as we saw²¹. Bowe himself and Bailly regard the dialogue as genuine, whereas Christopher Rowe takes the opposite stance²².

In such a situation I hesitate to venture my own view, but apart from other

¹⁶ Schleiermacher, op.cit., 460 : 'dass das Gespräch aus einer der besten Rednerschulen herstammend im allgemeinen gegen Sokrates und die Sokratiker, den Platon nicht ausgenommen gerichtet ist.'

¹⁷ H. Brünnecke, *Kleitophon wider Sokrates*, *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, 1913, 449-478.

¹⁸ "Wir haben es demnach endgültig mit einem Schriftsteller zu tun, der aus einem ganz bestimmten, unten noch näher zu beleuchtenden Grunde einen Protreptikos, dem er eine Aristotelische Pointe aufsetzt, an sich billigt, aber nun auch die Betätigung eines solchen Aufrufes fordert." J. Geffcken, *Das Rätsel des "Kleitophon"*, *Hermes* 68(1933), 431-433.

¹⁹ Cf. Slings, op.cit., 227-234.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 234, n.409.

²¹ Cf. Bowe, op.cit., 248.

²² Cf. J. A. Bailly, op.cit., 127. He emphasizes at the same time that the *Clitophon* is authentic in "two more important senses of authenticity: the *Clitophon* is an authentic ancient work, and adds to Socratic thought." C. Rowe, *Clitophon and Minos*, *The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political Thought*, ed. by Rowe & Schofield, Cambridge 2000, 303-309. Cf. also C. Rowe, *Book Notes: Plato and Socrates*, *Phronesis* 45-2(2000), 163, n.10.

grounds for doubt, at least the problem of wrongly ascribing the ‘Harming enemies and helping friends’ principle to Socrates (Sc2) seems to be still the fatal stumbling block to claims for authenticity. It is true that Clitophon also reports that Socrates (Sc2) retracted the principle in the end, but this does not seem enough to wipe out the preceding misascription. I find it very difficult for me to imagine that *Plato* wrote the *Clitophon* after – as most of us assume - finishing the *Crito*, where he rejects this very idea, as we saw above²³.

It is true that this misattribution could suggest how inadvertent the author of the dialogue was *unless he would have done it intentionally*, and this seems to diminish at least the plausibility of assuming “some bright pupil” author as Grube suggests.

Or one might argue in a more sophisticated way that this misattribution could be double-edged and used not only *for* establishing the inauthentic view, but also *against* it, assuming that the author would have done it *intentionally* in order to show how inaccurate Clitophon in the dialogue, not the author of the dialogue, is and to signalize the readers not to trust what he says about Socratic protreptic. In this connection one might recall Critias and Nicias who give the definitions of modesty (*sōphrosynē*) and courage (*andreia*) in the *Charmides* and in the *Laches* respectively which *prima facie* appear to be very Socratic (Sc3). They cannot, however, defend their definitions once they are cross-examined by Socrates himself.

Such an argument seems to have some plausibility, but then we do not understand why the author (Plato?) lets his *Socrates* in the opening frame dialogue (Sc1) say something which sounds “ganz unplatonisch.”

Moreover, the restriction of the method of elenchus in *Republic* VII (537e1-539d7) implies a bitter criticism of the “indiscriminate” elenchus done by Sc3 in the aporetic dialogues and *Republic* I. There, having explained “what a great evil comes from dialectic as it is currently practiced”, Socrates says to Glaucon as follows:

And isn't it one lasting precaution not to let them *taste* arguments while they're young? I don't suppose that it has escaped your notice that, when young people get their first taste of arguments, they misuse it by treating it as a kind

²³ One might say that it is not in the *Crito*, but in *Republic* I where that traditional view of justice is refuted. In my view that “helping friends and harming enemies” principle is substantially expressed by Crito in 45c5-d6 where he also uses the terms “δίκαιον” (c5) and “ἐχθροί” (c7). It is true that the word “φίλοι” is not used there, but the sentence “τοὺς ὑεῖς τοὺς σαυτοῦ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖς προδιδόναι” (c9) actually implies that notion. The refutation is given by Socrates in 49a4-e3 though it seems to be based on the previous discussions they had (like the one found in the *Gorgias*?) and is rather abridged.

of game of contradiction. They imitate those who've refuted them by refuting others themselves, and like puppies, they enjoy dragging and tearing those around them with their arguments.

They're excessively fond of it. [Glaucou]

Then, when they've refuted many and been refuted by them in turn, they forcefully and quickly fall into disbelieving what they believed before. And, as a result, they themselves and the whole of philosophy are discredited in the eyes of others. (539b1- c3)²⁴

This criticism recalls what Socrates says about his young followers in the *Apology*:

Furthermore, the young men who follow me around of their own free will, those who have most leisure, the sons of the very rich, *take pleasure* in hearing people questioned; they themselves often *imitate* me and try to question others. I think they find an abundance of men who believe they have some knowledge but know little or nothing. (23c2-6)

In another passage of the *Apology* where Socrates again describes the reaction of the young followers who watch people – supposedly the men of importance - refuted by Socrates:

Why then do some people *enjoy* spending considerable time in my company? You have heard why, gentlemen of the jury, I have told you the whole truth. They *enjoy* hearing those being questioned who think they are wise, but are not. And this is *not unpleasant*. (33b9-c4)

Here, it is not said that these young people cross-questioned each other, but from Socrates' description which even mentions the taste of *Schadenfreude* enjoyed by the young it would be easy to imagine what would follow at the next stage, where something like in the above quoted passage of *Republic VII* could happen. In this connection the famous episode in Xenophon's *Memorabilia* I-ii-40~46 would be also of significance. There he reports that young Alcibiades made Pericles lose face by refuting his idea of *nomos* in a precisely Socratic style of elenchus. As we saw above, Polemarchus' view of justice is refuted by Socrates without any positive alternative within *Republic I*. This fact seems to suggest that Plato himself was not

²⁴ The English translation including the *Apology* is Grube's (rev. by Reeve) in *Plato Complete Works* (Italics are mine).

yet worrying, as much as he would do in *Republic* VII, about the possible negative psychological effect on the person refuted by Socratic elenchus.

It is surely possible that Plato somehow came to be aware of the dangerous consequence of elenchus by himself after having written Book I, but is it not more plausible to assume, as many already have done, that somebody – whether he may be bright or dull – other than Plato wrote the *Clitophon* after reading *Republic* I, or more precisely and cautiously speaking after reading up to 354c3²⁵, and that Plato, having found Clitophon’s demand to be justified, then wrote the rest of the *Republic*²⁶? Without any decisive external evidence this view must also remain speculative in the end, but I am not sure if it is so “extremely speculative” as Slings says it is²⁷.

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²⁵ So long as there are good arguments for the six-book division instead of the conventional ten-book division, it would be safer to follow Stephanus page reference as Sedley suggests. Cf., David Sedley, Socratic intellectualism in the *Republic*’s central digression in G. Boys-Stones, D. E. Murr and C. Gill (eds.), *The Platonic Art of Philosophy*, Cambridge, 2013, p.73. However, even if the “six-book scheme” is closer to the original division, it still seems to be clear enough that the author, Plato himself, is fully conscious of the clear break in content between 354c3 and 357a1f. where he lets Socrates say “Ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα εἰπὼν ὤμην λόγου ἀπηλλάχθαι· τὸ δ’ ἦν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε προοίμιον.” characterizing the preceding discussion up to 354c3 as “προοίμιον.”

²⁶ Comparing Clitophon’s demand with Glaucon’s, Irwin writes as follows: “Like Socrates at the end of Book I (354b3-c3), Glaucon thinks a definition of justice is needed (358b4-7); he follows Clitophon’s demand to know what justice is and why it is worth while (*Clit.* 408d1-e3). If he accepted the CA [i.e. craft-analogy, the analogy between virtue and craft-knowledge, cf., Irwin, the book below, p. xv.], he should also accept Clitophon’s way of fulfilling that demand – an account of the subject matter and product of justice (*Clit.* 409a4-410e4). But that kind of account would imply that justice is a c-good (i.e. goods chosen only for their consequences), and Glaucon insists on a proof that it is a b-good [i.e. goods chosen for themselves and for their consequences]; he rejects the account required by the CA.” Irwin, T., *Plato’s Moral Theory*, Oxford, 1977, 185; cf., *ibid.*, p.184.

²⁷ Slings, *op.cit.*, 206.