The Place of Fear and Shame in Aristotle

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Introduction

In this paper I try to shed some light on the place of shame in Aristotle's ethics, by using two comparisons as resources to motivate my arguments: one is the contrast between fear and shame in Aristotle's writings, and the other is the difference between Aristotle's standpoint concerning shame and Plato's in his *Laws*. Taking account of these comparisons, I try to elucidate the two-sided question: in what sense shame can be a semi-virtue and cannot be a virtue at all, from Aristotle's point of view.

Fear and Pity in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*

In his *Politics* 8.7, in the context of musical education, Aristotle mentions the catharsis of fear (φόβος) and pity (ἔλεος), which is achieved by music. At 1341b38-40 he promises to explain what catharsis is in the *Poetics*, but notoriously he does not seem to keep his word. Moreover, in the *Poetics* he does not define either fear or pity, even though he defines tragedy in terms of these two emotions (1449b24-28). Instead, he gives detailed definitions of them in the *Rhetoric* 2.5 and 2.8 as follows:[1]

> Let fear be defined as a painful or troubled feeling caused by the impression of an imminent evil that causes destruction or pain; for men do not fear all evils, for instance, becoming unjust or slow-witted, but only such as involve great pain or destruction, and only if they appear to be not far off but near at hand and threatening, for men do not fear things that are very remote; all know that they have to die, but as death is not near at hand, they are indifferent.
>
> (2.5. 1382a21-27)

> Let pity then be a kind of pain excited by the sight of evil, deadly or painful, which befalls one who does not deserve it; an evil which one might expect to come upon himself or one of his friends, and when it seems near. For it is evident that one who is likely to feel pity must be such as to think that he, or one

[1] English quotations from the *Rhetoric* are due to John H. Freese (trans.), *Aristotle: The Art of Rhetoric* (Loeb ed.), Cambridge, MA & London 1926.

of his friends, is liable to suffer some evil, and such an evil as has been stated in the definition or one similar, or nearly similar. (2.8. 1385b13-19)

First of all, what these passages make clear is the similarity of fear and pity. According to Aristotle, we *pity* someone 1) who suffers undeserved misfortunes, 2) when we can expect such misfortunes to happen to ourselves in the near future. In a similar way to (2), we *fear* the imminent evils, which 'appear to be not far off but near at hand and threatening', and this is said to be the reason why we do not fear death for the time being. In this way, both pity and fear are based on our belief in the possibility of misfortunes happening to ourselves in the near future.

The similarity of pity and fear does not lie only in the expected vicinity of their intentional objects. According to Aristotle, pity for others involves and presupposes fear for ourselves; he argues that we can feel *pity* for others when they suffer the kind of misfortune that we *fear* we may experience ourselves (1386a28-29)[2]. Furthermore, this relation between pity and fear can be described also in a converse way; he says that we *fear* the kind of misfortune which arouses our feeling of *pity* for others when it happen or will happen to them (1382b25-26)[3].

Therefore, according to his descriptions about fear and pity in the *Rhetoric*, these twin emotions are conceptually connected with each other in a biconditional way. To put it another way, in the *Rhetoric* it seems that he can successfully bridge between fear, which is basically a self–regarding emotion, and pity, which is an interpersonal emotion and is aroused for the other citizens in the political community.[4]

Fear and Shame in Plato's *Laws*

Though, as we have seen, Aristotle tries to relate fear with pity which is a social emotion aroused in the political community, it is possible to analyse the intentional object of fear in a different way, and to relate it with another social emotion, i.e. shame (αἰσχύνη) or modesty (αἰδώς).

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[2] $(\forall x)[aFx \rightarrow (xHb \rightarrow aPb)]$
(aFx: a fears x, xHb: x happens to b, aPb: a pities b)

[3] $(\forall x)[(xHb \rightarrow aPb) \rightarrow aFx]$

[4] I have briefly argued about the similarities and the dissimilarities between fear and pity in the *Poetics* and the *Rhetoric* in 'The modality of pity in Aristotle's *Poetics*', in McLynn, Nakagawa and Nishimura (eds.), *Corners of the Mind -Classical Traditions, East and West-*, Keio University Press 2007, 131-7.

In Book 1 of Plato's *Laws*, the main character in this dialogue, the Athenian Stranger, maintains that we often *fear* that we will get a bad name for doing something wrong, and that the legislator should pay attention to this type of fear:

> *Athenian*: Tell me: can we conceive of two roughly opposite kinds of fear?
> *Cleinias*: Which?
> *Athenian*: These: when we expect evils to occur, we are in fear of them, I suppose?
> *Cleinias*: Yes.
> *Athenian*: And we often fear for our reputation, when we imagine we are going to get a bad name for doing or saying something disgraceful. This is the fear which we, and I fancy everyone else, call 'shame (αἰσχύνη)'.
> *Cleinias*: Surely.
> *Athenian*: These are the two fears I meant. The second resists pains and the other things we dread, as well as our keenest and most frequent pleasures.
> *Cleinias*: Very true.
> *Athenian*: The legislator, then, and anybody of the slightest merit, values this fear very highly, and gives it the name 'modesty (αἰδώς)'. The feeling of confidence that is its opposite he calls 'insolence (ἀναίδεια)', and reckons it to be the biggest curse anyone could suffer, whether in his private or his public life.[5] (646e4-647b1)

In this passage, we can see that Plato or the Athenian Stranger in the *Laws* classifies two types of fear[6], and the second type of fear is considered to be shame (αἰσχύνη, 647a2) or modesty (αἰδώς, 647a10) we feel when we imagine we are going to get a bad name for doing something disgraceful. This emotion seems to be missing in Aristotle's analysis of fear in the *Rhetoric* 2.5, and contrastingly Aristotle does not accept that we fear our becoming unjust (1382a22-23). It is true that becoming unjust and getting a bad name for doing something disgraceful are not the same thing literally, but there is a subtle gap between the *Laws* and the *Rhetoric* concerning the intentional objects of fear, and we need to explain it more explicitly.

[5] English quotations from Plato's *Laws* are due to Trevor J. Saunders (trans.), *Plato: The Laws*, Penguin Books 1970.

[6] On this passage, Kato comments that Plato refines his analysis of musical education presented in the *Republic*, by distinguishing two types of fear and identifying modesty in the *Laws* (Shinro Kato, 'Plato's theory of musical education: what we learn from it' (in Japanese), *Historia Philosophiae* 49, The Society of Philosophy of Tokyo Metropolitan University 2007, 1-21, at 14-5).

Moreover, when Aristotle argues about the feeling of shame in the *Rhetoric* 2.6, he defines shame without reference to fear in its definiens, as 'a kind of pain or disorder in respect of misdeeds in the past, present, or future, which seem to tend to bring disgrace' (1383b12-14). And, besides, we cannot find such a classification of fear in this chapter of the *Rhetoric*, as corresponds to that in the *Laws*.

I do not intend to claim that he took account of the passage quoted above from the *Laws* or that he argued directly against the Athenian Stranger or Plato when he defined fear and shame in the *Rhetoric*, even though it is clear from his explicit reference to Plato's *Laws* at 1264b26 that Aristotle had read the *Laws* when he was writing the *Politics*. Rather, I just mean to say that we can find an intriguing contrast between them concerning the concept of fear and shame, which is worthwhile to investigate further.

In the following sections, I will use the contrast about the intentional objects and contents of fear and shame, as a launching pad to examine its ethical or political implications for Aristotle. In order to consider this matter, first, I shall examine how Aristotle analyses fear and shame in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, which is supposed to be the prologue to the *Politics* and, therefore, can be regarded as a kind of political treatise. Next, I try to investigate a background of Aristotle's distinction between fear and shame, and to conjecture some ethical or political implications from his position.

Fear and Shame in the *Nicomachean Ethics*

To begin with, let me confirm the matter of terminology concerning shame, before we have a look at Aristotle's arguments in the *Nicomachean Ethics*.

Konstan observes that Aristotle is conscious of the distinct ranges of meaning of 'αἰσχύνη' and 'αἰδώς'; on the one hand. 'αἰσχύνη' reflects back on misdeeds with regret, and, on the other hand, 'αἰδώς' is prospective or forward-looking. [7] As a matter of fact, however, the Athenian Stranger (in the passage quoted above from the *Laws*) and Aristotle (in the passages quoted below from the *Nicomachean Ethics*) seem to use 'αἰσχύνη' and 'αἰδώς' as interchangeable with each other, as endorsed by commentators[8]. If it is the case, and unless he confuses one with the other, the next question is how Aristotle can consider these two terms to be interchangeable. In my discussion, basically I use an English word 'shame' to

[7] David Konstan, *The Emotions of The Ancient Greeks*, Toronto 2006, 95.

[8] Thomas L. Pangle, *The Laws of Plato*, Chicago & London 1980, 518n55; Terence Irwin, *Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics*, Indianapolis 1999 (2nd edition), 227, 347; cf. Bernard Williams, *Shame and Necessity*, Berkeley 1993, 194n9.

blanket these two emotions, even though I use 'shame' and 'modesty' respectively in order to translate the two Greek words, 'αἰσχύνη' and 'αἰδώς'.

In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, fear and shame are dealt with in the different contexts. Let me briefly identify them before going into the detailed arguments.

In parallel with other moral virtues, in the *Nicomachean Ethics* 2.7 Aristotle identifies courage (ἀνδρεία) as the mean concerning fear, which is between two vices, namely the excess (δειλός, coward) and the deficiency of feeling fear (nameless), and he argues about the specific features of courage in 3.6-9. As contrasted with fear, it is claimed without any detailed argument that there exists no moral virtue concerning shame, even though he identifies it as the mean between the excess (καταπλήξ, a bashful person) and the deficiency (ἀναίσχυντος, an insolent person) (1108a31-35), and even though he admits that a bad reputation can be one of the objects we fear (1115a10).

Then, Aristotle concretely describes shame in the *Nicomachean Ethics* 4.9, which is the last chapter of the books dealing with moral virtues except for justice. He begins this chapter (4.9) by pointing out a certain similarity between shame and fear as far as concerned with their bodily effects:

> It is not proper to talk of modesty (αἰδώς) as a certain virtue, since it seems to be a feeling rather than a state. At any rate, it is defined as a kind of fear of disgrace (φόβος τις ἀδοξίας), and it produces an effect similar to that of fear of something dreadful; for the people feeling shame blush, and the people fearing death turn pale. Then, both appear to be in a sense bodily effects, which are thought to be feelings rather than states. This feeling is suitable not for every age but for youth; for we think that the young people should feel modesty, since they, living by feelings, make many mistakes but are restrained by the modesty. Then, we praise the young people feeling modesty, but nobody would praise an elderly person for feeling shame, because we do not think that he should do anything involving shame. (1128b10-21)

In this passage, Aristotle underlines the similarity between fear and shame in respect to their bodily effects, and, moreover, he actually introduces such a definition of modesty or shame as 'a kind of fear of disgrace' (1128b11-12). If this definition would be his genuine and final one of shame, rather than a common opinion about shame just as a starting point for his following investigation, his view concerning fear and shame would be not so quite different from that of the Athenian

Stranger in Plato's *Laws*. However, it is not the whole story; we have several reasons for thinking of Aristotle as distinguishing fear and shame in some ways.

In the first place, as we have seen, while Aristotle analyses the moral virtue of courage as the mean concerning fear, he does not accept shame as a moral virtue at all (1128b10), even though young people can be restrained by feeling shame, from making mistakes (1128b16-18). In other words, according to Aristotle, while there must be the right occasions we should feel fear on and the right objects we should feel fear for (cf. 1106b21-23), a virtuous person as such does not have any appropriate occasions or objects for shame.

Secondly, while a decent person can feel fear for a proper object on a proper occasion, a person who feels shame is only hypothetically decent; five lines after the passage quoted above, Aristotle says that shame has a hypothetical or conditional grammar (which reminds us of a hypothetical imperative formulated by Kant):

> Being such as to do something shameful is characteristic of a base person. And it is absurd to consider oneself to be a decent person for the reason that he would feel shame if he would do such an action; for modesty is concerning voluntary actions, and the decent person will never do the base actions voluntarily. But modesty can be hypothetically (ἐξ ὑποθέσεως) decent; if one would do, he would feel shame. However, this is not fit for virtues. If it is base to be insolent and to have no modesty about doing disgraceful things, it is not decent to feel shame when one does such actions. Continence is not virtue either, but it is a kind of mixed state. (1128b25-34)

Generally speaking, it is a question whether shame mentioned in this passage is retrospective or prospective.[9] Aristotle describes a hypothetical structure of shame in the optative mood which forms a less vivid future conditional: 'one would feel shame if he would do such an action (εἰ πράξαι, αἰσχύνοιτ' ἄν)' (1128b30). Moreover, it is mainly this prospective shame that can restrain the young people from making mistakes. Hence, at least we can say that Aristotle is concerned not only with retrospective shame but also with prospective one.

This point can be confirmed also by his definition of shame in the *Rhetoric* 2.6, as 'a kind of pain or disorder in respect of misdeeds in the *past*, *present*, or *future*, which seem to tend to bring disgrace (italics mine)' (1383b12-14). The reference to

[9] On this passage Irwin comments that 'Aristotle is concerned here with retrospective shame at actions we have done' (Terence Irwin, *op. cit*., 227); cf. C. C. W. Taylor, *Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics Books II-IV*, Oxford 2006, 235-6.

the past, the present and the future suggests that it is one and the same person who can feel retrospective shame and prospective one. In this way, whereas fear is usually only prospective, shame can be both retrospective and prospective. In this respect, fear and shame should be clearly separated from each other.

Additionally, let me adduce the following passage from the *Topics* 4.5, which supports my assumption that Aristotle consciously distinguishes shame and fear:

> If someone says that shame is fear or that anger is pain, it will follow that the species and the genus do not belong to the same thing; for shame is in the reasoning part but fear is in the spirited part, and pain is in the appetitive part (for pleasure also is in this) but anger is in the spirited part. Hence, the supposed terms (fear and pain) are not genera, since they do not naturally come to be in the same thing as the species. (126a6-12)

In this context where he is discussing the rules to identify a proper genus of something, we can see Aristotle arguing against the view that fear is an appropriate genus of shame. It is because fear and shame should be located in quite different parts of the soul respectively according to the tripartition-explanation of the soul, which is proposed by *Socrates* in Plato's *Republic*. We can summarize the classification presupposed here in the following way:

A) the reasoning part : shame
B) the spirited part: fear, anger
C) the appetitive part : pain, pleasure

Now we can be fairly certain that the target of this passage is such a view as the Athenian Stranger advocates in Book 1 of the *Laws*. Therefore, Aristotle here presents his argument to attack a Platonic view on fear (in the *Laws*) by using another Platonic view on soul, i.e. the tripartition explanation of soul (in the *Republic*), to which he does not have to commit on his part.

As a matter of fact, it is highly controversial whether Aristotle here fairly describes the place of shame in Platonic tripartition of the soul and whether this is just an argument *ad hominem* or not. [10] However, we can say at least that this passage is more harmonious to the very assumption that he tries to separate shame from fear conceptually, as we have conjectured from the passages of the *Nicomachean Ethics*.

[10] Cf. Douglas L. Cairns, *Aidos: The Psychology and Ethics of Honour and Shame in Ancient Greek Literature*, Oxfrord 1993, 385n123. My present concern in this paper is confined to Aristotle's reaction to the so-called Platonic or Academic position rather than Plato's genuine view.

We can summarize the contrastive features of Aristotelian fear and shame by a following table, where I have bracketed the feature which is questionable and will be later argued for:

	Fear	Shame
1) Object :	imminent evil to cause pain	voluntary base action to bring disgrace
2) Bodily effect:	turning pale	blushing
3) Mean:	virtue: courage	non-virtue
4) Structure:	(non-hypothetical)	hypothetical
5) Direction:	prospective	retrospective, prospective
6) Function:		restraining from mistakes

We have seen that Aristotle rigidly distinguishes fear and shame in his unique ways. Then, in the next section we shall investigate his background for this distinction and some implications from the features of shame we have so far identified.

Background and Some Implications

On the one hand, in Book 1 of the *Laws* the Athenian Stranger criticises the legislators who deal with courage (ἀνδρεία) separately from other virtues, and he claims that legislators should aim at all the four virtues (justice, temperance, wisdom, courage) as a whole, which whoever battles in a civil war should acquire in order to win the war (629a-631a). Then, after ranking courage at the last place among the four cardinal virtues which are divine goods (631b-d), he starts again to examine several activities promoting courage, and distinguishes its two aspects; one aspect concerns resisting pains, and the other resisting pleasures (632d-634a). The latter aspect of courage, namely a kind of self-control connected with σωφροσύνη, is echoed in the context where he identifies shame as a fear resisting not only pains but also pleasures (646e-647d), in order to evaluate rightly an educational effect of drinking wine in a symposium (a drinking party).

On the other hand, as underlined by Schofield[11], not only in Book 10 but also in Book 1 of the *Nicomachean Ethics,* Aristotle occasionally suggests that ethics falls under politics in a broad sense, and identifies a true politician with a legislator; in

[11] Malcolm Schofield, 'Aristotle: an introduction' in Christopher Rowe and Malcolm Schofield (eds.), *The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political Thought*, Cambridge 2000, 310-20, at 310-4.

the last chapter (chapter 13) of Book 1 he says that a politician or legislator has been studying virtue, which is one of the main subjects in the *Nicomachean Ethics*:

> The true politician is also thought to have made most efforts on virtue above all; for he wishes to make the citizens good and obedient to the laws. As an example of this we have the legislators of the Cretans and the Spartans, and any others of this kind that there may have been. (1102a7-12)

Hence, although moral virtue is the main aim of legislation for both the Athenian Stranger in the *Laws* and Aristotle, they do not agree with each other about whether a legislator should pay attention to the matter of shame on a par with other moral virtues in a private or public life. Basically, we do not have to mediate the two positions by force, but we could understand their discrepancy in a compatible way by restricting the context where shame does matter.

In the context of education for the young people, it seems that shame can play a certain role in restraining them from pleasures or from making mistakes. Since Aristotle says that it is proper to feel shame not for elderly people but for the young, he could accept an educational role of shame. However, as a matter of fact, he never talks of any positive role of shame in the context of education in Book 7 and Book 8 of the *Politics*, and, therefore, it seems that there still remains the discrepancy between the Athenian Stranger and Aristotle concerning shame. Hereafter, then, I would like to speculate on some implications from Aristotle's position.

Aristotle's analysis of shame is closely connected with his analysis of the structures of actions. I try to develop two implications as follows.

Firstly, his analysis of shame shows how he understands base actions; according to Aristotle, whoever feels shame can imagine the possibility of one's own voluntary wrongdoing. On the contrary, if someone does wrong involuntarily, such an action is supposed to be the object of one's own regret and other's pity rather than that of one's own shame. In the *Nicomachean Ethics* 3.1, Aristotle argues that involuntary actions involve pain and regret (μεταμέλεια) (1110b18-19), and that we feel pity or sympathy (συγγνώμη) for others' involuntary actions which are caused by ignorance of particular situations, whereas both voluntary base actions and ignorance of a general principle must be similarly blamed (1109b31-32, 1110b33-1111a2). In this way, the type of action for one's own shame is quite different from the type of action

for one's own regret and other's pity, which Aristotle is trying to connect with fear conceptually.

Moreover, the point that Aristotelian shame involves the possibility of one's own voluntary wrongdoing could make also a sharp contrast between Plato and Aristotle concerning the possibility of *akrasia*.

Stalley comments that Book 1 of Plato's *Laws* is concerned with describing the virtue to overcome wrongful desire, and that such a virtue is the opposite of the weakness of will or what Aristotle would call *akrasia*.[12] However, his comment may be rather misleading, since it suggests that Plato's *Laws* could be concerned with the weakness of will we should overcome. In fact, on the contrary, the Athenian Stranger explicitly denies the very possibility of voluntary wrongdoings and then acratic actions; in the context of Book 9, where he argues about how the legislators should deal with punishment, the Athenian Stranger maintains that all the wicked people are in all respects unwillingly wicked (860d1), and he agrees that all the people do unjust acts unwillingly (860d9).

In this way, how to understand shame is closely connected with how to estimate the possibility of voluntary wrongdoings, including acratic actions; whereas Platonic shame does not presuppose such kinds of actions, Aristotelian shame does presuppose them.

Secondly, Aristotle's analysis of the structure of shame inversely clarifies the structure of virtue. As Stewart suggests[13], since shame has a hypothetical structure and, then, it is not appropriate for a virtuous person, we can expect Aristotle to presuppose that moral virtues do not have such a hypothetical structure.

To explicate the place of shame in Aristotle's ethics, let me distinguish the following five cases at least:

[Case A] One does not and will not commit voluntary wrongdoing, and it is not because one feels shame for doing so but because one has a certain state not to do so.

[Case B] One can restrain oneself from wrongdoing because one feels shame for doing so.

[Case C] One cannot restrain oneself from wrongdoing even if one feels shame for doing so.

[12] R. F. Stalley, *An Introduction to Plato's Laws*, Indianapolis 1983, 50.

[13] J. A. Stewart, *Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle*, Oxford 1892, I. 372.

[Case D] One does not feel shame at all, even if one commits or will commit wrongdoing.

[Case E] One restrains oneself from doing a certain action even if it is a right action, because one is too sensitive to a bad reputation.

Now we can specify the status of shame (Case B) in comparison with other cases.

According to Aristotle, if someone does not do a certain action for the reason that he feels shame for doing it, as depicted in Case B, he is continent or self-controlled and, then, hypothetically decent. In this respect, Case B is superior to Case C (incontinence), since an incontinent person might commit wrongdoing even if he feels shame. Moreover, Case B can be considered to be the mean between Case D (the deficiency of shame, i.e. insolence) and Case E (the excess of shame, i.e. bashfulness), and, then, it is superior to the both cases.

Nonetheless, such a person as featured in Case B is not virtuous at all, and he is considerably different from another person in Case A (decency), since it is mainly because he feels shame or a kind of pain for doing a wrong action that he can refrain himself from wrongdoing. Even if he is continent or self-controlled, he is neither autonomous nor decent, since he is still vulnerable to the possibility to commit wrongdoing; for instance, if someone will not break his words only because he feels shame for violating his promise, he is neither autonomous nor decent. In the same way, Aristotle could say that if someone *does* a certain action because he feels shame for *not-doing* it, he is not virtuous intrinsically; for instance, if Ajax tried to win the shield of Achilles only because he felt shame for not doing so, he was neither virtuous nor brave. In this way, Aristotle's analysis of shame sheds light on how uniquely he understands the structures of base actions and virtues.

Even if Aristotelian shame can be a semi-virtue, as called by Burnyeat[14], for the reason that it can keep the youth away from vices, it is not the type of state which a person should continually cultivate until he becomes decent and virtuous. But it is the kind of feeling which should be finally reduced or annihilated when he becomes actually decent and virtuous, because the feeling of shame is rather a mark of one's possibility to commit base actions. To put it another way, metaphorically speaking, it is true that shame plays a role as the guiding ladder which someone climbs up in order to reach the goal of decency in the community, but it is the kind of ladder

[14] M. F. Burnyeat, 'Aristotle on learning to be good' in A. O. Rorty (ed.), *Essays on Aristotle's Ethics*, Berkeley & Los Angeles 1980, 69-92, at 78.

which should be eventually kicked away, since he does not need and should not use it once he gets his hands on the goal.

Conclusion

To conclude, let us get back to the topic I mentioned at the beginning of this paper.

For the moment, I am not courageous enough to get into the puzzling arguments about what catharsis is exactly in the *Politics* or in the *Poetics*, but I would like to pick up one of its crucial aspects concerning emotion.

As Shields formulates[15], hypothetically speaking, on the one hand, if catharsis is purification, emotion will be a healthy feature of a well-balanced soul. If catharsis is purgation, on the other hand, emotion in itself will be no good and inappropriate for a decent person, but, rather, it will be a kind of disease to be cured, as argued by some Stoic philosophers.

As we have seen, since Aristotle accepts that there exists a moral virtue as the mean concerning fear at least, clearly he cannot take the second apodosis: emotion is no good in itself nor appropriate for a decent person. However, of course, this does not necessarily mean all the types of emotion are desirable; eventually shame is not desirable in itself either, because it presupposes the possibility of one's own voluntary wrongdoing and, then, it is not qualified as a moral virtue.

Hence, from Aristotle's viewpoint, a remedy of catharsis is prescribed for pity and fear to recover their means, and it could be applied to shame also for recovering a genuine sense of fear, whether it is achieved by music or tragedy.

Belfiore attractively suggests the possibility that Aristotle's conception of catharsis was influenced by the idea of an allopathic catharsis provided by that symposium, i.e. drinking wine together, in Plato's *Laws* [16], which is recommended for cultivating modesty among the young people. I am not hesitant to agree with her suggestion that Aristotelian catharsis could be conceptually influenced by Plato, but I should think that such an influence, if any, must have been a reverse effect on Aristotle in quite an allopathic way. [17]

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[15] Christopher Shields, *Aristotle*, London & New York 2007, 388-9.

[16] Elizabeth S. Belfiore, *Tragic Pleasures: Aristotle on Plot and Emotion*, Princeton 1992, 39.

[17] I have received helpful comments on the previous versions of this paper from Masayuki Amano, Elizabeth Belfiore, David Charles, Kei Chiba, Shinro Kato, Malcolm Schofield and an anonymous referee, but I am afraid that I could not sufficiently respond to all of their comments in this paper.